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HIV IAIDS death and mortality rates have proven to be one of the largest threats to the economies of many 
developing countries, in particular Zimbabwe. Twenty five percent of the adult population in Zimbabwe is 
HIV positive and it is estimated that at least 2000 people die every week of the disease. Consequently, there 
Is an urgent need to find means and ways of redUCing the number of premature deaths due to AIDS. 
Access to affordable drugs will have great impact on reducing these premature deaths in the country. 
However high AIDS and opportunistic infections drug prices have rendered these medicines unaffordable 
and inaccessible to the vast majority of the population infected with the virus. Moreover the majority of the 
population has to meet most of its drug cost through out of pocket payments. Furthermore, high 
antiretroviral drugs prices have resulted in their exclusion from the essential drug list hence they cannot be 
made available in the public sector through public procurement. The costs of these medicines are beyond 
the financial means of the govemment, which has a very limited budget for the health sector. It is important 
however to note that these prices are international prices and are not set specifically for Zimbabwe. 
It is important to note that pharmaceutical prices are a function of both international agreements (for 
example patents) and domestic factors in the pharmaceutical market. The main aim of the study Is to 
analyse influences of supply side and demand side factors (patents, parallel importation, duties, taxes, mark 
ups, exchanges rates and competitive tendering) on the final end user prices. Furthermore, it will briefly 
assess the implication of the final end user prices obtained from the study on access to affordable 
antiretroviral drugs in Zimbabwe. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to obtain data from various key informants, 
pharmaCies, wholesalers and manufactures. The analysis of quantitative data was done using Excel and 
Stata software packages and a deSCriptive analysis method was used to interpret the data. 
The main findings from the study are that, patented antiretroviral and opportuniStic infections drugs are more 
expensive compared to their generic equivalents or therapeutic generic equivalents. lack of competition 
because of few therapeutic alternatives has led to a monopoly market for the few generics that are 
available. Nonetheless, this is not to say drugs should not be patented, patents are necessary since they 
promote and encourage investment in R&D and innovation of newer drugs. Thus, there is need to strike a 
balance between the commercial interest of multinationals and public health needs of developing countries. 












there are both positive and negative implications associated with both polices, those that target taxes and 
those that target mark-ups as means of trying to curb escalating prices. Competitive tendering has 
contributed enormously to lower drug prices in the public sector; this is because of high volumes purchased 
by the govemment, which consequently lead to high demand. The govemment also has high bargaining 
power. However, at present, competitive tendering has minimal impact on prices of the patented drugs since 
these are hardly procured by the govemment as a result of their exclusion from the essential list. 
Two sensitivity analyses are carried out, the first sensitive analysis assesses the sensitivity of final end user 
prices to a different exchange rate and the second analysis assesses the sensitivity of end user prices to the 
implementation of parallel importation. It is evident that prices of antiretrovirais could faU substantially if one 
assumed an offICial exchange rate as opposed to the black market rate that is currently prevailing in the 
country. Furthermore, the second sensitivity analysis further reinforces earlier findings that generic 
competition as a result of paraDel importation of generIcS could lead to a Significant reduction in drug prices 
even in the presence of parallel market rates. 
Additionally, antiretroviral drugs in Zimbabwe were found to be more expensive than in USA, Brazil,lndia 
and Uganda, ·for which comparable data is available. Thus, AIDS drugs are far from being equity priced. The 
expected relationship between the income level of a country and the prices of drugs is not obvious in this 
study. It was also found that the costs of year's triple therapy is out of the reach of average individuals in the 
country who have to work an equivalent of up to 15 years to purchase a year's triple therapy. Furthermore, 
the costs of providing antiretroviral drugs would far exceed the current health budget if the govemment were 
to provide such drugs to all those who need treatment. Antiretroviral drugs are out of the reach of both the 
government and the vast majority of the population. Only the elite members of the society can afford to 
purchase them in the private sector. 
The paper concludes by suggesting key policy recommendations that the govemment. with the help of the 
international community could adopt to try and curb escalating prices of vital drugs. However, the policies 












1 ~HAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTIOij 
1.1 Background and Overview 
Evidence from recently published literature has shown that, at least 21 million people have died of AIDS 
since the start of the pandemic 20 years ago. At least 36 million people are living with HIVIAIDS. and more 
than 25 million people leave in sub-Saharan Africa.1 The projections have atso shown that the number of 
AIDS deaths can be anticipated to escalate in the next 10 years to more than double the number of deaths 
due to all other causes if there is lack of or no treatment for the disease.2 Almost all the cases of HIVIAIDS 
are prevalent in communities that are already weakened by severe poverty, presence of other diseases and 
lack of education.3 The developing world has experienced at least 95% of aft AIDS deaths to date, and at 
least 2.5 million people die each year from the disease. The availability and affordability of antiretroviral 
drugs in the developed world has drastically reduced the mortality rates as a result of AIDS, for example 
Antiretroviral drugs have decreased the AIDS-related mortality rate in the USA by 75% in the short run." 
However the same cannot be said about the developing world where treatment for opportunistic infections 
such as Cryptococcosis and Candidiasis and antiretroviral therapy may be beyond the financial means of 
many public health systems and most individuals.5 ln developing countries, less than 10% of the people with 
HIV have access to antiretroviral therapy.s 
Several interrelated factors determine access to essential drugs, including drugs to treat HIV/AIDS and 
opportunistic infections. Among them are appropriate use of medicines, affordability (medicine prices), 
supply management, economic issues (e.g. sustainable financing). rational drug selection, legislation and 
regulation, manufacturing and distribution (thiS includes reliable systems to ensure medicine procurement, 
distribution and use), cultural factors and research and development (R&D) decisions. A number of World 
Health Organisation (WHO) member states have expressed the opinion that, unaffordability (hence high 
drug prices) is a chief contributing factor to lack of access to drugs. The market price of these drugs is often 
high; as a result, they are not affordable, and thus non-existent for the great majority of developing 
countries' population in need. Evidence from the literature also supports the notion that, although prices are 
1 Dorrington, et. AI, (2001) 
2 Ibid 
3 Panos Institute (2000) 
4 Perez-Cassas, (2000), Perez-Cassas et al. (2001), and UNAIDS (1998) 
5 Ibid 












not the only reason why people do not get access to affordable medicines, it is a major barrier in many 
developing countries.7 
Medicine prices are important to look at since drugs have certain characteristics that if access is improved 
more people are able to improve their health status. Additionally the importance of assessing the impact of 
supply and demand side factors on overall medicine prices hinges upon the fact that medicines constitute a 
large proportion of medical expenses in most developing countries both for households and for the health 
budget compared to other inputs like machinery. Although labour is an input factor that also constitutes a 
large proportion of the health budget, it is often not tradable. 
Data from poverty assessments from the developing world show that, exorbitant medicine prices is one of 
the main factors causing poor individuals to either avoid seeking treatment or to cut their treatment short.Bln 
Kampala, Uganda, three quarters of the population surveyed had reduced their spending on meals in order 
to buy medicines. High drug costs contribute indirectly to drug resistance, because of the high costs, poor 
people usually do not finish the course, and this results in strains not killed off by the medication, thereby 
developing resistance.9 On the other hand inability to finish the course as a result of high costs of drugs is 
not the only reason leading to resistance. Over consumption of drugs could also lead to resistance. 
Additionally. especially with respect to the HIV virus, it has been found that the virus develops its own 
resistance mechanism to certain drugS.10 
The problem of high drug costs can further be illustrated by looking at the treatment of pneumonia, one of 
the opportunistic infections associated with AIDS, which claims over three million lives each year. In 
Zambia, it costs about US$8-$10 to treat a single episode of the illness, provided that drugs are available. 
In this country, almost 60% of the population lives on monthly incomes of less than US$18 a month; this is 
equivalent to the cost of a minimum food basket. It is clear that "families living on the very margins of 
existence wouid have to cut their food spending by one-half to treat a single casew•11High AIDS medicine 
prices in poor countries have preordained poor people who suffer from AIDS to premature deaths.12 
One may argue that no prices are low enough to ensure access in the absence of adequate financing and 
delivery systems or in the presence of compromised financing and delivery systems as to make the 
7 Perez-Cassas, (2000) 
8 Oxfam (2001) 
9 Oxfam (2001) 
10 Naik (2002) 
11 Oxfam (2001) pp. 16 












attainment of the health goals promised by such drugs unlikely.13 Efficient financing and delivery 
mechanisms are essential since even with low prices, the majority of the population may still not be able to 
access and afford drugs if proper financing and delivery mechanisms are absent. Yet prices still remain an 
important part of affordability. Prices are also important in ensuring access to essential medicines especially 
for countries with lim~ed resources. Medicine prices remain a "locus of contestationw as they have for nearly 
50 years.14 Drug prices have. a reflective influence on other factors as well. Many system-wide policy 
choices are impacted on by the costs of obtaining medicines. For example, the decision as to whether 
AIDS-related drug care should be provided in the public sector or not. The Panos in~ute advocates that; • 
the main reason why antiretroviral drugs are not widely available in the developing world is the price of the 
drugs themselves' .15 Inclusion of certain drugs on the essential list to a great extent depends on the prices 
of drugs themselves since most governments primarily consider the price of the drugs before making a 
decision on whether to include the drug on the list or not,IS 
The final end user drug price is a function of number of factors of which most of them originate from local 
influences. These include, presence/absence of price regulation, import duties and tariffs, local taxes, 
wholesale and retail mark-ups, public medicine procurement polices, degree of compemion, value of the 
domestic currency, R&D costs, production costs, size of the market,17 and drug financing mechanisms. Yet, 
one of the most important major factor influencing final end user prices is the final price set by the industry 
for newer drugs for both the public and private heafth sector.18 More specifically newer drugs are proprietary 
(still new and under patent) as opposed to generics that are sold at prices closer to the cost of production. 
Since HIVIAIDS is qu~e recent and topical in medical history. most of the drugs manufactured especially to 
treat HIVIAIDS and related infections, are proprietary and therefore still patented in many countries. The 
degree of monopoly enjoyed by these on-patent drugs allow researched based companies to charge high 
monopoly prices, which render the treatment of AIDS and related illnesses less affordable than that of other 
diseases. 
13 Gray (2001) 
1. Gray (2001) 
15 Panos Institute (2002) 
16 Gray (2001) 
17 Investment in terms of research and development is positively related to the price of the drug, i.e. high research and 
development and production costs would be reflected in higher prices for the medicine than otherwise would be if such 
costs were lower. If the size of the market is big, prices tend to be relatively lower than in smaller markets since 
manufacturers would be trying to maintain a certain level of profit in these smaller markets. A detailed discussion is 
however beyond the scope of this paper. 












The price implications of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPs) are at the heart 
of the debate. This agreement concems itself with property rights protection and obligations (patent 
protection). TRIPs requires patent protection for all products and processes, with a minimum duration of 20 
years from the original date of filing the application, without any special concem for pharmaceuticals.19 
However filing is not the same as approval. It may take about 3-4 years from the date of filing before the 
product is approved and launched onto the market. Additionally tf a patent is granted it does not follow that 
the product will be approved, some patented products actually never make it onto the market. Nonetheless, 
the time granted for patent protection could conSiderably hinder the introduction of new generic drugs, 
depending on the way in which the national legislation is designed and implemented. These exclusive 
marketing rights coffered to multinational drug companies may allow them to command the highest possible 
prices, and thereby catering only for the countries' elites.2O This could leave such drugs out of the reach of 
the vast majority of people living in developing countries. Evidence from research undertaken has also 
shown that there is no relation betvieen prices and public heafth needs or buying power of households! 
individuals in roost developing countieS.21 
On the other hand, patents are viewed as essential mechanisms of appropriating economic returns on 
innovation. Patents are a necessary incentive to encourage companies in less developed and industrialised 
countries to channel R&D resources towards certain neglected diseases. However, patents are not always 
sufficient to achieve this.22It is also argued that technological transfer and foreign direct investment can be 
increased by facilitating access to technologies that patent holders may not be otherwise willing to transfer 
in the absence of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Additionally potential foreign investors may 
take into consideration IPR protection when making their decisions as to where to locate production 
facilities.23 
Nonetheless, the high cost of antiretrovlral drugs not only keeps patients from getting treatment but also 
dispirit health ministries from improving the quality of patient care through use of newer and better 
medicines.2ot Although prices of antiretroviral drugs have been falling on average, they have not however 
fallen enough to reach millions of people in the developing Y«>rId who need them. Therefore, the question of 
whether a drug is under patent protection or not is of significant Importance in determining the final price and 
consequently it is important for drug procurement. 
19 WHO (2000) 
20 Perez-Casas, (2000) 
21 Ibid 
22 Kettler and Collins (2001) 
23 South Centre (2001) 












In the light of the above, this paper will outline and discuss the most important supply side and demand side 
factors influencing pharmaceutical prices in Zimbabwe. The paper also seeks to establish and assess how 
these factors impact on the final consumer prices of antiretroviral and opportunistic infections drugs in 
Zimbabwe. The paper will also present how HIVIAIDS medicine prices in Zimbabwe compare with 
international prices. Furthermore the paper will briefly discuss how the final end user prices of drugs affect 
affordability of essential HIVIAIDS drugs, based on the health budget of the country and the average income 
of most individuals. On the other hand, medicine prices should not be the only focus of attention. Developing 
health systems and financing drug purchases should also be taken Into account since they are also 
fundamental pieces of the "access jigsaw".25 This paper however mainly focuses on prices but at the same 
time is aware that price is not the only issue. Finally the paper offers some suggestions and 
recommendations for policy makers in order to assist them make informed decisions. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
AIDS is the largest single threat to health in Zimbabwe. It has reduced life expectancy from 65 years before 
the epidemic struck to 37.13 years, it has created some 800,000 orphans, it kills 700 a week, and it wreaks 
havoc within the Zimbabwean economy. These figures are alarming but true. The number of AIDS deaths is 
disturbing and the social and economic impact is going to be devastating if something is not done. The 
existing problem lies in finding means and ways of reducing the number of people dying of AIDS and the 
number of AIDS cases. Prevention is always better than cure and should be any country's number one 
priority. On the other hand, people who are already infected do not really benefit from preventive methods. 
Lack of access to affordable medicines is an issue of growing concern since it is one of the main reasons 
rendering the reduction in the number of people dying of the disease impossible. The WHO considers 
equitable access to health care a basic human right. It is argued that it is the poor who are most affected by 
this disease and die quickly from it. It is clear that the poor cannot afford the expensive medicines. Once a 
person is Infected. access to reasonably priced medicines eventually becomes the bottom line to long-term 
survival. It follows that high prices for drugs imply an inequitable and unequal access to life saving 
medicines. Keeping an AIDS patient alive for a year in Zimbabwe costs up to US $15 000, which is 24 times 
the average annual income in Zimbabwe.26 Hence, medicine prices and economic access (affordability) to 
HIV/AIDS and opportunistic infections medicines is a major cause for concern. 
25 Thomas (2001) 












1.3 Rationale For the Study 
Zimbabwe has one of the highest AIDSIHIV prevalence rates in Africa and one of the highest in the \WI'Id. 
One in every four adults is infected with HIV (25%). It is projected that 1.6 million of Zimbabwe's population 
of 12.5 million is living with HIV. In 1997, approximately 2,000 people acquired new HIV infection every 
week and 15% of new AIDS cases were among children under fIVe years of age. The rising number of 
orphans is changing the social structure of the country.v 
Households spent about Z!N $23 million related to AIDS deaths in 1999. It is estimated that by 2005, 60% of 
Zimbabwe's health budget wiD be required for AIDS treatment alone. The cost of a triple therapy cocktail is 
unaffordable to the majority of the people of this country where the monthly wage averages around 20-55 
US doliars.28High unemployment rates coupled with low wage rates relative to other countries has resulted 
in iow average income in many sectors of the economy that the majority of the population are engaged in. 
There is little research that has been done In developing countries to assess the impact of factors affecting 
drug pricing on the final consumer price and consequently on access to affordable drugs. Empirical 
evidence is necessary since one is able to Identify problem areas for which intervention should be targeted 
at. There is need to identify those variables which are contributing to high drug prices, specifIC to Zimbabwe. 
Without this knowledge, interventions could be targeted at wrong areas leading to a waste of scarce 
resources. 
Premature deaths as a result of AIDS can be prevented if the right treatment is available and can be 
economically accessed by those who need it the most. Although drug pricing is not the only obstacle to 
access, it is apparent that it plays a central role in many poor countries. The above discussion establishes 
the need to carry out an investigation on how supply side and demand side factors impact on HIVIAIDS and 
AIDS related drug prices and consequently how the final consumer prices impact on access to affordable 
HIVIAIDS drugs in Zimbabwe. This study will then provide information that will facilitate policy makers in 
decision and policy making. Additionally, the study will also contribute to the already existing body of 
literature pertaining to medicine pricing. The study will also help Identify the gap that exists between what 
the ministry of heaith hopes to achieve with regard to access to affordable medicines and what is happening 
in practice. 
27 UNAIDS and U.S. Agency for International Development (1999) 












1.4 Aims and objectives 
1.4.1 Aim 
To establish and study the fundamental factors that influence the prices of medicines and assess the extent 
to which they impact on HIVIAIDS and opportunistic infections end user medicine prices and to briefly 
assess the implication of final consumer prices on access to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs in Zimbabwe. 
1.4.2 Specific Objectives 
1. To map out and summarise how the pharmaceutical sector in Zimbabwe functions and to review the 
current national pharmaceutical legislation, and assess how the TRiPs agreement is implemented into 
the law system. 
2. To identify and quantify the most important drugs for HIV/AIDS and opportunistic infections that are 
registered and marketed in Zimbabwe and review the patent status of these drugs (i.e. defining the 
scope of patentibility of these drugs). 
3. To conduct an analysis of factors affecting drug pricing in order to study. accurately assess and 
document how these elements (generic competition, drug patenting, exchange rates, mark-ups, duties, 
taxes and competitive tendering, parallel importation) have influenced the prices of HIV/AIDS and 
opportunistic infections drugs in Zimbabwe. 
4. To compare prices of HIVIAIDS drugs in Zimbabwe with international prices and briefly assess and 
discuss the implications of final consumer prices on access to affordable drugs used to treat HIVIAIDS. 
5. To identify and recommend appropriate policy recommendations for intervention to ensure regular 
access to affordable HIV/AIDS and AIDS related drugs. 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
The remainder of paper is arranged as follows: 
.:. Chapter two gives an overview of the country context in terms of the demographic pattern, health 













.:. Chapter three presents a detailed review of the literature that has been written in relation to the 
topic at hand. Specifically it will look at the global pharmaceutical industry. the market for drugs, the 
economic theory on price regulation, and the background to the trade related aspects of intellectual 
property rights. The chapter also presents a brief look at competitive tendering, medicine mark-ups, 
duties and taxes. Finally chapter three outlines the conceptual approach to medicine pricing . 
• :. Chapter four provides and outlines the methodology used during data collection and to analyse the 
data. Furthermore, the type of data collected is also presented. The chapter summarises the data 
collection instruments, identifies the variables, data source and data collection procedures. The 
chapter also identifies data and research problems as well as biases and limitations associated 
with the study . 
• :. An overview of the pharmaceutical industry in Zimbabwe is presented in chapter five . 
• :. Chapter six deals with the analysis of results and discussion of key findings. The analysis of results 
• I . 
is presented descriptively and analytically and this is. ~llowed by a discussion of key research 
findings . 













2 ~HAPTER 2: COUNTRY CONTEX] 
2.1 Introduction 
This section will mainly focus on the background to the country. It will mainly discuss· the demographic 
pattern ofthe country, the economy, and the health sector. A brief discussion of the background to the AIDS 
crisis in Zimbab'Ne and other developing countries is also given. 
2.2 Background of the Country 
Zimbab'Ne is a developing, low-income and landlocked country situated in southern Africa. It is bordered by 
~uth Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique and it has a total area of 390,580 sq km. The country is 
characterised by recurrent droughts but floods and severe storms are rare. 29 
2.2.1 Demography 
The total population is estimated to be 12,806,143 and it has a population annual growth rate of about 2% 
(2000 est.). About 58% percent of the population is between the age of 15 and 64 and 32% of the 
population lives in the urban areas and 68% resides in rural areas. It has a birth rate of 24.68 birthsl1000 
population and a death rate of 23.22 deaths/1000 population and has a life expectancy of 37.13 years (2001 
est.) These estimates unambiguously take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS. This can 
result in lo'Ner life expectancy, higher infant mortality rates and death rates, lo'Ner population growth rates, 
and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected. It is also 
estimated that 85% of the population is literate. 30 
2.2.2 Economy 
The country's economy Is agricultural based; tobacco is the key cash crop and com is the chief source of 
food. Other products include cotton, sorghum, peanuts, wheat, sugarcane, soybeans, and coffee. There are 
abundant tea plantations in the country and dairy farming is important in the high veld. Forests in the South-
East of Zimbab'Ne yield precious hardwoods, including teak and mahogany. Zimbab'Ne is endo'Ned with a 
29 World fact book (2001) 












wide selection of mineral resources, including gold, nickel, asbestos, tin, iron, chromate, copper, and coal. 
Its industrial products include iron and steel, cement, foodstuffs, machinery, textiles, and oonsumergoods. A 
hydroelectric station at Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River generates most of its electric power. The country 
has good roads, railway networks and domestic and intemational air services. The country's major trading 
partners are South Africa and the United Kingdom. Zimbabwe is a member of the Southem African 
Development Community.31 
The country has a GOP of US $7.4 billion (2000 est.), a GOP annual growth rate of -4,9% (2000 est.), a 
GNI of US $5.9 billion and a GNI per capita of US $480 (2000 est.). The GOP breaks down as follows: 
agriculture (18.3%). industry (35.3%), and services (46.4%). The GOP growth rate was 10.6% in 1996 and-
0.7% in 1999. The GOP was US $8.6 bUlion in 1996 and US $5.5 billion in 1999.32 This shows that the GOP 
growth rate has been declining over the years and it has recently been negative. Sixty percent of the 
population lives below the poverty line. The country has a labour force of 5.5 million and an unemployment 
rate of about 50%. Badly needed support from the IMF suffers delays in part because of the country's fenure 
to meet budgetary goals. Inflation rose from an annual rate of 32% in 1998 to 59% in 1999,60% in 2000, 
103% in 2001 and 122.5% to date. This implies that prices of all commodities are skyrocketing at the 
moment in the country.33 
The country currently faces a severe shortage of foreign currency, which has led to ongoing shortages of 
liquid fuels and a scramble for funds to import materials and spares, as well as the decline or even failure of 
businesses that depend on imports. Since the govemment is reluctant to adjust exchange rates to more 
realistic leveis. an unoffICial market for foreign currency has developed where foreign currency is bought at 
rates that about four times the offICial rates. This has increased inflation, which is floating at around 120%. 
Worse still, energy costs have spiralled much faster than overall inflation and are now a key 'M>rry for the 
country.34 
The country faces a wide variety of economic problems as it struggles to consolidate earlier moves to 
develop a market-oriented economy. Excessive govemment deficits and AIDS are steadily weakening the 
economy.35 
31 The Columbia Electronic Encyclopaedia (2000) 
32 These figures are at current prices, World fact book (2001) and world development indicators database (2002) 
33 Wortd fact book (2001) and wortd development indicators database (2002) 
34 Country Spotlight (2001) 












2.2.3 Health sector 
AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis account for many of the deaths. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the AIDS 
epidemic, few people see themselves to be at risk. Denial and stigma encourage discrimination and weaken 
prevention efforts. Lack of strong government leadership has hampered HIV prevention efforts in the past.36 
Zimbabwe's struggling health system is supposed to have free health care for the poorer people, but it is 
short of expertise and staff. After independence in 1980, the country inherited a health system that was 
prejudiced towards the ruling colonial minority since the early 20th century. Nonetheless the govemment 
then embarked .. a programme of free primary health care for all in an effort to correct the historical 
imbalances. The policy saw substantial investments in the health sector. the construction of new health 
centres, clinics, hospitals and hiring of more staff. 37 
At the tum of the Meade, the govemment realised that performance in the health sector was deteriorating 
dJJe to declining fiscal provisions. To date the Ministry of Health has been experiencing a decline in its real 
financial allocation from the central government. On the other hand, the demand and need for health 
services have been increasing. The major problems faCing the health sector are: 
a) The. centralised public health administration which is not responsive to local demands and 
expectations, 
b) Dwindling of fiscal resources, and 
c) Loss of core personnel to the private sector and neighbouring coumries.38 
In an effort to recover some costs the govemment has re-introduced user fees, which are collected by 
district hospitais. The district hospitals retain 50% of the user fees for hospital management but primary 
healthcare for example immunization (mainly at baby clinics) is free. An important development was the 
introduction of a compulsory Social Health Insurance in 1998 for those employed in the formal sector only. 
This does not cover medicines, and it is a form of co-payment insurance. A small proportion of the 
population is covered by private insurance where they make private contributions and in some cases the 
employer also contributes a certain amount. Most insurance companies do cover drugs as weD. However, 
36 U.S. Agency for Intemational Development (1999) 













the majority of the population (which is involved in the informal sector and the unemployed) has to rely on 
out of pocket payments for consultation, treatment and drugs.39 
Poor drug financing implies that the consumers may have to bear all the costs of financing drugs. In many 
developing countries, financial resources are not sufficient enough for the governments to subsidise a 
reasonable amount for drugs. Moreover many donors have cut or discontinued their funding to Zimbab\Ye 
for political reasons and this has put further constraints on the already limited health sector budget,40 Hence, 
very few drugs for AIDS related illnesses are subsidised in Zimbab\Ye. In addition the shortage of foreign 
currency and depreciation of many African countries' currencies implies that the costs of importing drugs 
has increased. Developing countries produce less than 10% of total drug output and moreover, many local 
producers import almost 90% of their raw materials.41 
It is the policy of government to treat all patients. and this is the policy that is currently working. The 
government is also encouraging people to join private medical aid societies, which have different schemes 
and different 'levels. This would enable individuals to afford at least one medical aid scheme with a certain 
amount of cover. However the government can never really afford to treat eVeryone in the country:t2 
Healthcare financing is both private and public, yet the government Is by far responsible for the vast majority 
of the population. This is because the majority of the population is around 15 years of age, and do not earn 
any income. Additionally, there is a small percentage of people who \YOrk relative to the whole population. 
All civil servants belong to a public service medical aid.43 Private health insurance plays an important role in 
financing the health care needs of a small section of the society. In July 1995, 23 private health insurance 
schemes covered 750,000 Zimbabweans and their dependents. This represents less than 7% of the 
population. Employer-based and industry-based programs account for the smallest percentage of 
beneficiaries, and the programs have recently been declining in number because of viability problems. 
Membership is around 260,000, and an the members are employed in the formal sector. Hence, only about 
17 percent of all those in formal employment, (excluding agricultural and domestic services). are covered by 
employer-based schemes. In 1994 individual direct spending accounted for 31% ofthe total health spending 
in the private sector. This accounted for the largest single category of expenditure. Health insurance 
39 Chirove (1999) 
40 Ibid 














accounted for 11.8%. The above reflects an inequitable distribution of resources in favour of the well-off 
members of the population.44 
Anyone who eams under Z!N $500 is entitled to free health care, however; this still needs to be revised, 
The burden of disease has increased so have the costs of running a hospital. There is a social dimension 
fund that comes under labour and social welfare, where people tend to apply for help, though this is usually 
very much under funded since the demand surpasses what they can offer,45 
Health care in Zimbabwe is supplied by govemment institutions, private not-tor-profit institutions (missions, 
NGOs), mining and industrial companies, private for-profit institutions, (general practitioners, private 
hospitals and clinics) and traditional medical practitioners (including faith healers and traditional midwives). 
However, the public sector is still by far the most dominant player ... 6 The govemment has buiR 1200 clinics, 
and there are 55 district hospitals and 4 teaching 'hospitals and a special psychiatric hospital. The local 
govemments(municipalities} have their own clinics and people in urban areas use these."? 
The ministry of heatth has a national drug policy,which contains guidelines for selection, procurement, 
distribution, managing and rational use of drugs. The policy aims to Improve and sustain, within the 
available resources, the heatth of the majority of the population of Zimbabwe;by treating, curing, reducing or 
preventing diseases and conditions through the use of safe, effective, good quality and affordable drugs . 
. 'The govemment's aim is to have at least 90% drug. availability for all essential drugs at primary healthcare 
levels at all times,46 The ministry of health conducts drug surveys, and the last survey was done in 
September/October 2001. This survey established that there was a drug availability of 69,2%; nonetheless. 
the govemment would like 100% drug availability for the vita~ drugs.49 However, they have never reached 
100% availability but in the past years they managed to reach about 95% vital drug availability. 50 
There is a generic procurement policy that encourages all pharmacies in public hospitals and clinics to buy, 
dispense and prescribe generic drugs as opposed to branded medicines. The Ministry of HeaRh has its own 
Essential Drugs list for Zimbabwe (EDUZ), which was first published in 1994. The drugs are put into the 
44 Ministry of Health and Child Welfare 
45 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
47 Wilson (2002) 
48 The Zimbabwe national drug policy (1995) 
49 Drugs are grouped into three categories. vital. essential and necessary drugs 












following categories; C level (clinic level) B level (district level) A level (provincial level) and S level is the 
teaching level. Each institution orders drugs according to drugs that fall under its category. 51 
The government has a tendering policy system, where NatPharm (which was 100% government owned but 
has recently been privatised) , tenders for drugs on behalf of the government for the whole country. 
Government Hospitals order their drugs through NatPharm 52. Hospitals also have little funds of their own, 
and can buy through informal tenders up to a value of ZW $5.5 million. NatPharm does not pay import 
duties on drugs they import. Mission hospitals also order from the government and may also get donations, 
but the government is not too keen on drug donations, they VIIOuld prefer donations in form of money and 
use it to tender for drugs. Mission hospitals also get a budget from the government but they are under 
funded.53 
The Zimbabwean health budget 
Year Health budget (1.W $) Health Budget (US $) AI I % Of the total 
government 
budget 
2001 12 billion 218 million 4.36% 
2002 22 billion 400 million 5.21% 
The table above shows the allocation of the health budget between 2001 and 2002. It is clear that the 
budget allocated to the health sector increased by about US '$ 182 million. This is quite a substantial 
amount in normal terms, yet the real increase is much lower than the above figure if we take into account 
the high rates of inflation currently being experienced in the country. The ministry of health argues that this 
is not enough, they need a budget of about ZW $35 billion to meet all the necessary basic health needs of 
the country's population. The domestic health allocation per person was US $9.2154 in 1999 and US $15.44 
in 2000. The national health expenditure as a percentage of GOP was 7.8% in 1999.55 
Over and above, it is clear that the health sector in Zimbabwe suffers from a shortage of fmancial resources. 
Only a small percentage of the population is covered by health Insurance. It follows that treatment expenses 
have to be borne by households and individuals through out of pocket payments. 
51 Wilson (2002) 
52 This is the government buyer for drugs for all government hospitals and some mission hospitals. 
53 Ibid 
54 This was 2.2% of the GOP 












2.3 Background to the AIDS crisis in Zimbabwe and Other Developing Countries 
Zimbabwe is among the poorest countries in the wortd. Studies have found HIV prevalence rates of 70% to 
86% among high-risk groups. By 1998 an estimated 750,000 children had lost one or both parents to AIDS, 
with projections of nearly one million AIDS orphans by 2005. 56 As a result of HIVIAIDS, the crude death rate 
in Zimbabwe will be more than 200% higher in 2005 than it was in 1990. BUCEN estimates that in 1997, 
28% of pregnant women attending Harare urban antenatal clinics and 46% attending Beitbridge rural district 
clinics tested positive for HIV. Seven out of ten AIDS cases occur among Zimbabweans during the most 
productive years of their lives, between the ages of 20 to 49. About 70,000 Zimbabweans were expected to 
die from AIDS-related diseases in 1999; this is twice as many as in 1998.57 On average, it costs an 
individual about])N $40,000 (725 US dollars) a month for a single therapy of drugs to fight the disease.58 
UNAIDS has estimated that there were 3 million deaths due to AIDS in 2000, (which is the highest global 
total since the beginning of the epidemic) and there were 5.3 million newly infected individuals. Overa" it is 
estimated that 36.1 million individuals are living with HIV or AIDS.59 The vast majority of these are in Africa 
and South and South-East Asia. Recent studies have shown that 70% of the people living with HIV or AIDS 
(25.3 million) and of new infections of HIV (3.8 million) are in Sub-Saharan Africa. About 15 % of the people 
living with HIV or AIDS (5.8 million) and of new infections of HIV (780,000) are in South and So~East 
Asia. In eight countries in Africa (including Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe), 15% or more of the 
adult population is living with HIV or AIDS. 60This speedy rise in adult deaths has resulted in an exceptional 
number of orphans: 13.2 minion wortdwide and 12.1 million of.thElm are in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. In 
some African countries, one in every 10 children is an orphan. Furthermore, while infection rates are 
declining in the developed wortd, they are constant or rising in most developing countries.li1 
Evidence from studies recentiy undertaken has shown that AIDS destroys human capital, weakens 
institutions, and aggravates deeper and wider poverty in society. There is also an increasing body of 
evidence which shows that, to a great extent, AIDS causes poverty. and that some aspects of being poor 
can increase the risk of exposure and susceptibility to the disease.52 The disease can worsen income 
distribution and has overwhelming effects on households. It has reduced agricultural productivity by about 
56 UNAIDS and U.S. Agency for International Development (1999) 
57 Ibid 
56 Ibid 
59 World Bank Group (2001) 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 












50% in Zambia.63 AIDS is also likely to increase poverty through the rise in the number of children who lose 
one or both parents. Current studies have shown that orphans have signifICantly lower enrolment rates and 
are more likely to be malnourished than non-orphans. Escaping poverty (for orphans) would be made even 
more difficult in the absence of good schooling and adequate nutrition.54 
Remarkable social and economic effects are evident on families and the economy as a result of illnesses 
and deaths caused by HIV/AIDS. Many households will exhaust their resources caring for the sick and 
dying, coping with funeral expenses, and compensating for lost labour and income. In urban areas 
especially, traditional and social care support mechanisms are breaking down at a very fast rate. FamHies 
are now hesitant to support members of their extended families since they are also battling to meet their 
own needs and obligations. Food security is being endangered by AIDS-related decline in the labour force 
and rural household savings. Households are forced to plant less labour-intensive crops, resulting in a 61% 
loss in rural production. A study by The Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) showed that the death of a 
breadwinner due to AIDS has a much greater impact on crop production in small-scale farming and 
communal areas than does a non-AIDS death.55 
At national lavel, a diminished skilled labour pool as a result of the disease affects economic prosperity. 
foreign investment, and sustainable development. Seven out often AIDS cases occur among those in the 
most productive stage of their lives, between the ages of 20 to 49. The costs of training new workers, lost 
productivity, ,and absenteeism due to HIVIAIDSare taking their toll on many industries in developing 
countries.66 According to the World Bank, HIVIAIDS ranks second among all diseases in loss of productive 
years in Sub-Saharan Africa. A study on a major transport company with 11 ,SOO workers in Zimbabwe found 
that more than 3,400 employees were HIV-positive in 1996, with 64 AIDS-related deaths. The company's 
total HIV/AIDS costs were 20% of the company's profits. Health care costs accounted for half the loss in 
profits.S7 
HIVIAIDS costs threaten to devastate many health sectors in Africa and other deveioping countries that face 
severe budget cutbacks. As a result, they are overloaded and understaffed. In Zimbabwe it was projected 
that by 2005, 60% of the budget of the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare will be required for AIDS 
treatment alone, excluding antiretroviral therapy. Insurers are trying to protect their businesses from such 
63 Adeyi, Hecht and Soucat (2001) 
64 World Bank Group (2001) 














losses by charging high premiums or refusing policies to HIV positive clients. For example Life insurance 
premiums in Zimbabwe quadrupled in two years because of HIVIAIDS.68 
Thirty-eight countries have seen a life expectancy decline since 1990 and most of these countries are hard 
hit by the AIDS pandemic. 12 countries lost more than fIVe years.59 Table 1 below shows the life expectancy 
of five African countries before and after the epidemic. It is evident that all these countries have lost quite a 
substantial amount of years due to AIDS. Zimbabwe has the highest number of years lost equal to 26 years. 
Of the Five countries, South Africa has the least number of years lost due to the epidemic. 
Table 1: Cuts In African life expectancies due to AIDS 
country life expectancy before lift expectancy after the lOltyul'l 
the epidemic epidemic 
Zimbabwe 65 39 26 
Botswana 62 40 22 
South Africa 65 56 9 
Uganda 54 43 11 
Zambia 56 37 20 
Source: US census Bureau, ·World Population Profile: 1998.· 
The high AIDS rates in Africa require an urgent, workable and sustainable intervention if the number of 
people dying is to be reduced. Access to low priced drugs is an indispensable step to solving the problem. 
Nevertheless, even with low medicine prices, substantially expanding access to essential medicines will 
, , , 
require additional domestic and international financing for the purchase of essential drugs as well as for 
building effective health and supply systems. This is necessary because when drug prices fall and many low 
priced essential drugs are already avatlable, there is still no guarantee that poor communities can afford 
them. This is particularly true for HIVIAIDS drugs. Even with costs coming down to US $500 per patient per 
year, it is still well beyond the reach of many developing countries whose total health expenditure is less 
than US $10 to US $20 per person per year. In addition, a course of antibiotics can be purchased for the 
equivalent of two to three hours wage and a year's treatment for HIV infection cost the equivalent of four to 
six months' salary in industrialised countries. However, in the developing world a course of antibiotics for 
pneumonia may cost one month's wage and if a year's treatment of HIV were purchased, it would use up 
about 30 years' income. Thus, considerable amounts of external financing are required in these cases.70 
68 Ibid 
69 U.S. Agency for Intemational Development (1999) 












With personal incomes frequently less than $2 a day, there is considerable agreement that half of the 
world's population is too poor to pay for many of the drugs they need from their own resources even at the 
lowest possible prices. Organised and sustainable health care financing is required for domestic public 
health and social security budgets where national resources are inadequate, and this needs to be reinforced 
by intemational assistance.71 
Given the above evidence, it is true that the health and AIDS crisis in Africa cannot be ignored. Something 
needs to be done and ~ has to be done soon. Ignoring this outcry would only,increase the mortal~ rates in 
developing countries thereby negatively impacting on production in all sectors of the economy as noted 
above. This would worsen the already weakened and struggling economies. We cannot keep a blind eye on 
those already infected because without them, their children would endure even worse suffering. This is 
because of the correlation between poverty and HIV. As noted earlier, increasing evidence has led to a wide 
belief that AIDS causes poverty, and moreover some aspects of being poor can enhance the risk and 
susceptibil~ to the disease. The children of infected parents cannot be left to fend for themselves, 
enrolment rates will drop and these children will still live in poverty and history will just repeat itself. In 
countries like Brazil where there are no restrictive patent Iaws72, generic production of HIV drugs is taking 
place. The result has been that the country's mortal~ rate has fallen by about 50%.13 High costs of 
antiretroviral drugs not only keep patients from getting treatment but also discourage health ministries from 
improving thequal~ of patient care through use of newer and better medicines.74 
Economic access entails affordabil~. None the less, if the annual average income in Zimbabwe and other 
developing countries is barely enough to purchase a monthly supply of triple therapy, then the problem at 
hand is even greater than meets th  eye. There is need to put an effective mechanism in place to make 
newer drugs affordable to developing countries. Access is sensitive to prices because most peopie in 
developing countries pay for medicines from their own pockets and a significantly large portion of the budget 
is spent on medicines by state health services. Moreover price is related to the presence of monopoly or 
market exclusiv~ in the drug markets.75 In the presence of intense financial pressures facing developing 
counties' health systems, high medicine prices are without a doubt a Significant aspect that needs to be 
71 Ibid 
72 However such countries may have strong local working requirements. 
13 Chequer et.al (2000) 
74 Oxfam (2001) 












addressed,76 This suggests that a reduction in drug prices of essential AIDS medication is a key step 
towards bringing the AIDS mortality rate down in most Sub-Saharan countries. 
On the other hand, it has been shown that developing countries' govemments can do far more to make 
medicines available at more affordable prices. Most governments spend far less on public health compared 
to their military budgets. Additionally tertiary level services used by better off groups absorb a large 
proportion of the health budget while primary health care is under fundedP Therefore there is need for the 
reduction in medicines prices to be accompanied by huge efforts by developing countries' govemmentswith 
regard to enhancing and managing public sector finances as 'Nell as developing their health systems if 
positive results are to be realised. Thus, the pricing problem can only be tackled if policy makers become 
aware of the main factors that result in such high prices. Only when such knowledge is available can one 
come up with policies that can dampen the influences of such factors on prices. 
76 Thomas (2001) 












3 ~HAPTER 3: LITERA lURE REVIEij 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature that has been written in relation to the topic at hand. Specifically it will 
look at the global pharmaceutical industry, the market for drugs, the economic theory on price regulation, 
and the background to the TRiPs. It also provides a brief look at competitive tendering, mark-ups duties and 
taxes. Finally it outlines a conceptual approach to medicine pricing. 
3.2 The Global Pharmaceutical Industry 
Medicines are exceptional goods and also the only input in health care (apart from equipment) that is a 
physical good that is traded internationally. The production of Pharmaceuticals requires extensive 
technological input and consequently a somewhat high level of industrialization, but on the other hand they 
are very essential. 78 New drugs require an even higher order of technological degree for their production. In 
practice, very few commodities are both essential and command high technical input. As a result, the 
medicine industry has a distinctive type of social responsibUity. The essential nature of drugs makes a 
solution to reducing their costs rather urgent On the other hand, the costs of high knowledge input 
necessary for their conception and production also needs to be covered.79 
The pharmaceutical industry is dominated by a small number of extremely po\IIt'erful transitional 
corporations. Recent years have seen major acquisitions and mergers. The pharmaceutical industry differs 
from a 'textbook' monopoly market in that no Single firm dominates the market. On the other hand, there is 
evidence of substantial concentration within therapeutic sub-markets. In addition, best-seller drugs in these 
categories may account for large percentages of the sales volumes. There is also evidence of large intra-
firm trade since many of the manufacturers of raw materials are located in countries of origin of the major 
firms. This results in "transfer priCing- (where prices are inflated to achieve optimal profits for the global 
level) practices for local subsidiaries.80 
78 Thomas (2001) 
79 Ibid 
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An iflalysis of the worki s top 75 medci1 es ",veals that. after the USA Britain's pharmaceutical cOOlpanes 
market ,;hare is easi~ more :han all its ElI"npean cnn'petitors cnntJined, The US ocOl'Klmy spends 2,3% of 
its GOP on medci1e, arne fol1o'MId by France, \·.ti ch spends aix:lJt2'1. of it~ GOP 00 rrndk;ine, The top 
fIVe j:tlamaceullca! mallllfacturers are stnwn .., tfille 2 below, t r; ~ :~ l:j e aI~o m ..mmarises the won.fs 
market share lor each COOlp<¥1y 
T ,bl" 2, LMding Ph"m.c"utical cC>!pOf.tloos i1 200{) 
Pfizer has 7,3% of the world's ma'tet share f~owec by GlaxoSmithKI"'e 11t h 6 9% The top ten eadir.;) 
~harn\1(eut;caI COOlp1ll e, have 45,7% of the WO'lJ's market share and the top 20 h<l\le 64% oj the world's 
market share, Of the leadi1g top 20 c~ane~, all but OM are in Europe and USA 
In 2001 0: wa~ estimated that, researc h-based pharm< Geutical OJn~anb "' vested US $30,5 biUm .., R&D 
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St~tes, U,S,-O'Ml ed arm ~brll~d COOdllCtoo on "d :>too.1 us 56,8 M oo in RW, [},oar the post three 
docajes. the <1n-ou nt of sales allocated to R&D has in.;:;re~sed from 11.4% .., 1970 b 17,4% in 1999 !n 
2001, it was est imated to be ',8,5%, !n :he US pharmoceutk'al manufacturers "'vest a tlgher percentage of 
~aes reve~ in R&D thall ~ rtual~ ~ny industry, in.;:;ll1iirrg h':J h-Rh ..,dllS1'I'ls sl):;h ~s etoctroncs, 
aerospace, COOlputem, and .utornctlie~,<' 
It is af<:--u~ to deterrnlle exoctly tnw Ill.J('h R&D is dewtee to specifK :»seases due to the nature 01 the 
RW prlfeSS aoo of diseases, A prOOLKt rmy be lmie' rwestigatK:.-1 to treat se"eral conditK:l1s or dlseffies 












Nonetheless, about US $4.1 billion will be spent on products acting on parasitic and infectious diseases, 
including anti-viral and antibiotic compounds. M 
From the above, H is evident that the US spends more on R&D than any other country. Moreover H has the 
highest market share than any other country. The U.S. also has three of leading top five pharmaceutical 
companies in the IIIIOrld. This concentration could also be as a result of mergers and acquisHions beNteen 
companies, with the headquarters located in the US. It is important to note that of the leading top twenty 
manufacturing companies there is no African owned manufacturing pharmaceutical company and there is 
only one company in Asia (Japan). This means that most of the production and research and development 
takes place in the US and Europe. In addition all African manufacturers that are domestically owned only 
specialise in generic production. In other IIIIOrdS they depend on innovations of the big companies in the 
North and West. This is so because of the large amounts of capital investments that are required in the 
manufacturing of branded drugs, which is definitely out of the reach of many, if not all domestically owned 
manufacturing companies in Africa. 
3.3 The Market for Drugs and Health Care· 
People demand medicines because they want to be healthy. This desire to remain healthy has Ied'to a 
continuous growth in the demand for health care and medicines. The demand for drugs has increased 
dramatically over the past years 40 years as a result of changes in the age structure, increasing real 
incomes and improvements in medical technology. A market for medicines has tIIIIO groups: the buyers and 
the sellers who interact with each other.as 
The basis for any discussion of markets is the theory of perfect competition. The theory assumes that there 
are many buyers and sellers in the market who should be left to transact their businesses without 
government interference. Additionally, information is freely available and complete and consumers act 
. rationally to maximise their satisfaction. There are also no barriers to entry and hence the forces of demand 
and supply will only be the most efficient ways of allocating resources through prices, since prices are 
assumed to reflect the preference of consumers.56 Consequently, goods are allocated where they are 
needed and valued the most. However as shall be demonstrated below, these condHions barely apply in the 
market for health care and medicines. 
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The drug market is characterised by market imperfections. There are four main types of market failure in the 
drug market which are drawn from those in the broader health market: 
a) Poor and asymmetric access to information 
b) FaKure of competition 
c) Homogenous goods 
d) Extemalities87 
Hence, there is need to highlight these imperfections in order to identify and evaluate the role of the state in 
rectifying such imperfections. 
Medicines are not ordinary goods of trade and are far from being homogenous. The demand and supply 
characteristiCs of drugs do not follow the classic market principleS like other ordinary goods.88 When you go 
and purch~ a CD for example, you know exactly what you want; you really do not need a shop assistant 
to tell you what you should buy. Conversely in the market for drugs you may need a doctor/pharmacist to 
diagnose you and tell you what type of medicine to take to cure your illness. A three-tiered demand structure 
exists. This is so because the prescribers (physicians and others) are in most cases the actual demanders 
and the patients are the consumers and the health care system is in most cases the payer (this is both in 
the public and private sector). Consumers generallydo not choose or pay (if they have private Insurance) for 
the medicines they take. This is especially true for developed countries.1I9 Even in developing countries 
(where consumers meet their drug costs through out of pocket payments) itl~ in most cases the doctors or 
" ~ 
~urses who prescribe (except in some case whefe consumers buy ·over the counter" medicines). In 
countries such as the US where the burden of buying health insurance is passed on to individuals, it is still 
the doctors who decide on the appropriate treatment and insurance companies pay for the costs of drugs.so 
87 The World Bank Group (2002) 
88 Velasquez. Madrid. Quick (1998) 
89 Bloom And Van Reenen (1998) 




















-Physicians User fees 
-Private hospitals and pharmacies 
25 
As illustrated in figure 2 above, the payers for drugs or health care are; insurance companies, patients and 
the government in form of reimbursements and out of pocket payments (user fees) to health care providers. 
In addition the patient is also the consumer but also pays taxes (e.g. income tax) to the government and 
premiums to health insurance companies. The government could also act as the provider in the public 
sector. Physicians, private pharmacies and hospitals are also providers of health care. However. inmost 
developing countries like Zimbabwe, the insurance companies only serve a few privileged individuals. Most 
patients meet their drug and other treatment costs through out of pocket payments. limited government 
financial resources have further exacerbated the problem. 
More often than not. competition among suppliers is often limited especially where patented products are 
concerned. Patenting of pharmaceutical products prevents other firms from producing the same products for 
a number of years. This creates monopoly, resulting in high prices for medicines. Barriers to entry exist. 
Medical professionals, pharmaceutical products, pharmacies and hospitals have to be registered and 
licensed.s1 Such regulations restrict entry into the market and lowers competition. Exit is also not free in the 
sense that when students qualify as doctors, there is a lock-in effect. There is a substantial amount of 
resources invested in order to qualify; this restricts them to the health care industry. Their skills are not 
transferable to other sector with great ease. 92 On the other hand although other sectors do experience lock 
in effects they may not have other characteristics noted above that encourage market failure. Moreover, in 
91 Normand (1991) 












hospitals and in the production of pharmaceuticals, there are huge economies of scale present. Their 
existence can resuit in the creation of monopolies or oligopolies. This can allow such firms to set prices 
above the perfectly competitive price.93 
Medicines also have both positive and negative spillover effects (externalities). Extemalities occur when the 
consumption or non-consumption of a good affects the welfare of parties not directly involved in the 
transaction.94 Such spill over effects occur for E;lxample, if one person purchases a vaccine for whopping 
cough, he confers benefits to himself. On the other hand, other people also benefit because they are now 
protected against catching whooping cough from that particular purchaser. The free market misses such 
spillover effects. Under-provision of vaccinations IN'Ould occur in a free market and consequently this IN'Ould 
impose a cost upon society. In the presence of extemalities, the market price does not accurately contain all 
the information about the benefits and costs of a market transaction.95 
Incomplete information exists in this market because information known to the prescribers and consumers 
is unbalanced and selective. Information is not equally shared between buyers and sellers, instead the seller 
(physician), ~as far more information than the purchaser (patient). The separation of buyers and sellers is 
undermined by the presence of information asymmetry. Most medical information can not be easily 
understood by patients because it is technically complex and IN'Orse still many illnesses do not repeat 
themselves, thus gaining such information is very costly.96 Additionally, a mistaken or wrong choice carnes 
greater costs and is less reversible than in other cases, at IN'Orst, wrong decisions can lead to death. 
Patients lack the necessary expertise to diagnose their illnesses or to tell whether the prescribed treatment 
is necessary or appropriate. They may also not be in a position to make rational decisions.97 In this case, 
heaith care or medicines can be viewed as merit goods; they will be under-consumed if left to individual 
discretion to consume them. More often than not, treatment is difflCuit to postpone and thus it becomes 
virtually impossible to shop around. In any case it is not easy to choose between different doctors' opinions. 
Consequently patients rely on doctors to act in their best interest, doctors make decisions regarding 
consumption of heaith care on the patients' behalf. On the other hand, doctors may have their own interests; 
this creates the possibility of doctors exploiting patients by advising more treatment to be purchased than is 
93 Culyer (19&3) and Maynard (1986) 
94lipsey and Courant (1996) 
95 Green (2001) 
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necessary.98 This demonstrates the notation of supply-induced demand in the market for medicines and 
health care.99 
In summary, the preceding discussion reflects on the major imperfections that are present in the market for 
medicines and health care. There is an unresolved debate with regard to the implications of market failures 
in this market and with respect to the role of the state. The true social costs and benefits are often not 
reflected by market forces of demand and supply,hence social objectives such as equity cannot be met in 
the presence such market imperfections. The factors given above coupled with the inability of the industry to 
develop and· provide needed drugs for most tropical diseases in developing countries has resulted in market 
failure.1OO The existence of market failure does present a case that justifies and warrants government 
intervention through poIicymaking, pharmaceutical regulation and legislation, financing and provision in 
order to correct market failures and to meet health objectives.10l 
On the other hand govemment's attempt to introduce changes in order to correct market failure may 
introduce further distortions. Govemment failure is when intervention results in outcomes that depart from 
the efficienCy or distributional goals by which markets are judged to fal1.102 The govemment could be 
incompetent and seeks to serve the interest of .strong interest groups (both intemal and extemai). for 
.example, the interests of big businesses like the pharmaceutical sector and the interests of politicians and 
the bureaucracy. It can be argued that the government may lack the necessary information to implement 
and make policies. There is no guarantee that if the market fails due to lack of information the government 
would not suffer from the same problem. 
Govemment intervention could result in unpredictable or perverse outcomes. For example direct drug price 
controls could reduce the supply of necessary medicines. Furthermore. how does one define public interest. 
the state could end up pursuing the interests of strong interest groups. It is also true that every policy has 
winners and losers and it becomes very diffICult to choose who should win and who should 1ose.103 
Implementation failures may also occur as a result of public sector ineffICiencies. Individuals may also seek 
to influence the state in order to transfer Yleifare to themselves. Consequently lobby groups will Invest 
resources to influence the form, structure and incidence of regulations, licensing laws and tariffs in the drug 
911 Green (2001), Mills and Gilson (1998), Le Grand and Robison (1984) 
99 Gray (2001) 
100 Market failure occurs when the outcomes of the market are not pareto efficient, i.e. it is still possible to reallocate 
resources and make at least someone better off without making anyone worse off. 
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market.104 This effort by individuals to maximise their utility could result in social waste and dead weight loss 
to society. 
In conclusion market failure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for government intervention. 
GovernmenHailure also exists. It follows that there is need to arrange incentives to improve government 
performance. for example by defining objectives or by allowing the private sector to provide health care and 
medicines if they are financed or subsidised by the government. It is important therefore to evaluate 
government failures equally against market failures and assess the role of the market and the government 
against these failures. 
3.4 Economic Theory on Price Regulation 
Controlling the price of drugs is a major issue on the policy agenda of most modem governments. The 
reasons are dear. On the one hand, modem states are generally assumed to have a duty to provide at least 
a minimum level of healthcare services for their citizens. The costs of these healthcare services appear to 
,be inexorably rising. 
In the previQus section it was noted that market failure warraots government intervention. Market faUure 
rationales for. price regulation are: 
a} Monopoly Markets 
b) Natural Monopolies 
c) Externalities 
d) Public/merit Goodsl05 
e) OligopolieS 
Monopoly markets, externalities, oligopolies and merit goods are the most common rationaies for regulation 
in the drug market. In the drug market, monopoly can arise as a result of patents, which allows firms to 
enjoy monopoly power for twenty years before generic substitutes can be manufactured. In addition, since 
doctors are likely to have only a limited concern for expenditure control and generaHy do not have 
comprehensive information on drug prices they are somewhat insensitive to price changes. lOS Since 
104 Ajam (2000) 
105 Merit goods are goods that are deemed especially important and public goods are goods that have characteristics 
that if they provide benefits to anyone, they can (at little or no additional costs) provide benefits to a large group of 
people. 












monopolists set higher prices for consumers who are more price insensitive, it follows that, in the absence of 
price regulation pharmaceutical firms will most likely charge inflated prices that are above their marginal 
costs for their on-patent drugs, and can restrict output at the same time.107 
Another reason could be due to the absence of many competitors in the market for drugs. The industry 
could be dominated by large few concentrated firms or mufti-nationals which gives rise to oligopolies. 108 On 
the other hand oligopolies or monopolies can enjoy large economies of scale, this allows such producers to 
move to lower new short run average cost curves. This will enable them to produce more cheaply and the 
marginal cost curve can shift down and to the right. If it shifts far enough the producer could end up 
prodUCing the perfect competitive output and charging a price close or equal to marginal cost. However this 
can only be realised if the economies of scale are large enough to influence the cost of production.l09 
Economic theory tells us that the presence of monopolies or oligopolies results in dead weight loss to 
society, it leads to socially excessive expenditure in the absence of price regulation. Therefore, it is argued 
that the introduction of price regulation in the market for drugs would reduce any deadweight loss that may 
occur. There are different forms of price regulation both direct and indirect However the goal of any form of 
price regulation is to compel firms to charge prices that are equal or close to their marginal costs of 
production. This new price would be below the monopoly price, and consequently the firms would Increase 
their drug output production. In this instance there will be more users since the price that consumers pay for 
drugs may fall. Additionally, price regulation leads to lower introductory prices for new drugs; this increases 
the welfare of consumers by increasing their consumer surplus and reducing the size of the dead weight 
loss. lID This is likely to benefit consumers in poorer countries who have to meet their drug expenses through 
out of pocket payments. 
On the other hand, evidence has shown that there are certain costs associated with price regulation.111 
Firstly, it is argued that signifICant price cuts might damage the welfare of patients as much as the drug firms 
In the long run. Pharmaceutical firms will only embark on R&D into the next generation of drugs if they 
expect to earn a profitable return on their efforts,112 Global prices may be particularly sensitive to change in 
prices in a particular country especially if its market share is large relative to other countries. For instance, 
any severe price cuts in the UK could provide a cue for retaliatory price-cutting by regulators in other 
107 Bloom And Van Reenen (1998) 
108 Ibid 
109 Griffiths and Wall (2000) 
110 Clark (1993) 
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countries. Also, UK prices could actually feed directly into the prices of many other European countries. This 
is because the UK price is a key element in other countries' reference pricing schemes. This creates an 
add~ional means for UK prices to influence global prices113• The impact of one country's regulation on firms 
based in another country is increasingly expanding because of the indirect effects from the regulatory use of 
international price comparison. Many countries like Canada and Italy use foreign prices to set limits on their 
domestic prices.114 Danzon argues that the overall impact of price comparisons is to force prices to 
converge on the lowest price in the comparison group countries.115 It follows that dramatic reductions in UK 
prices of pharmaceuticals for example would negatively impact on the long run success of the UK 
pharmaceutical industry through their effect on international prices. 
Furthermore, Danzon argues that this convergence of price does not benefit consumers because of high 
R&D costs, which causes drug firms to be wlnerable to aggressive price regulations. This is so because in 
the long run, investments in R&D and discovery of new innovative drugs would decline. This would have 
adverse effects on the supply of drugs for consumers worldwide. If prices become uniform across countries, 
then all consumers will be worse off in the long run than under policies which perm~ price differentials based 
on wilfingness to pay.us 
Stringent price regulation also tends to weaken competition between therapeutic substitutes and competition 
from generics and over-the-counter medicines that succeed as· cheaper alternatives in countries that allow 
freer pricing of branded drugs. By and large, the result is that the net difference in the price of drug therapy 
to consumers, between closely regulated countries (for example France and Italy) and those that allow freer 
pricing (such as Germany (until 1993} and the Unmd States) is not as great as has been disputed in studies 
that contrast only the prices of leading, branded, originator drugs. 117 
In addition to the above, evidence from studies done in the US have shown that generic competition 
operates as a more effective control on prices in iess regulated regimes. This is predominantly in the US, 
which have both more price competition and more generic competition between competitors than do 
regulated regimes.118 Furthermore, as price controls often go from being price ceilings to price floors, they 
113 Bloom And Van Reenen (1998) 
















can result in higher prices in the medium to long run, in contrast to allowing competitive pricing in the post 
patent period.119 
To sum up, in theory, direct price regulation may look attractive in the sense that consumer surplus could be 
increased. However, in cases where there are large economies of scale, direct price regulation may not be 
warranted since marginal cost pricing can be achieved depending on the extent of the economies of scale. 
In addition, direct price controls may not always result in increase in welfare in the long run. In countries 
which use foreign prices to set limits on their local prices, prices may converge on the lowest price in 
comparison country. This could adversely affect the long run success of the industry. This is so because 
drug firms in parent countries with huge foreign market shares may lack the motivation to invest in R&D if 
there is a fall in profits due to a reduction in prices in foreign markets. Indirect methods like generic 
competition have however showed more positive results. Thus policy makers should also pay attention to 
factors that have effect on the entire vector of pharmaceutical prices and not only those subjects specific to 
regulation. l20 On the other hand, complementary polices could be put in place to counteract the costs of 
price regulation so that net gains that benefit the society can be realized. 
3.5 Background to the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
Agreement 
"The 1994 Uruguay round negotiations resulted in th6 formation afthe World Trade organisation (WTO). The 
organisation had 132 members in 1997. All members are expected to abide by its rules and where 
necessary, the national legislations of these countries are to be harmonised with these rules. There are 
certain treaties on trade in goods and services annexed to the WTO convention of which one of them is the 
TRiPs agreement. This agreement established certain minimum standards in the field of intellectual 
property. In addition public health should be considered when implementing this agreement.121 
The provisions of the WTO agreement on TRIPs are extending patents rights around the world. Advocates 
of the TRiPs agreement believe that patents and other intellectual property rights are important and 
indispensable in the promotion of R&D as well as stimulating innovation. On the other hand, critics of the 
agreement have expressed concern about the impact of TRIPs on the availability and prices of drugs. They 
argue that scant evidence exist that shows that the introduction of TRiPs has promoted transfer of R&D or 
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innovation from the deveioped world to the developing countries. In other words, more often than not 
evidence seems to show that TRiPs mostly benefits the already developed world. Thus, evidence from 
proponents and critics of TRIPs has sparked a heated debate as to whether the benefits of TRIPs out weigh 
its costs. 
3.5.1 Protection of International Property Rights Before TRIPs 
Many states did not issue patents for pharmaceuticals on their territories before the Uruguay round, hence 
the inventors had no rights over their inventions in those particular countries. The absence of global 
minimum level of patent protection gave these governments substantial flexibility to decide upon the 
coverage and legal framework for patents, in harmony with" their national interests.122 However, at 
internationaHevel, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WI PO) managed the regulation and protection 
of intellectual'property. The WIPO conventions especially the Paris convention only imposed general rules, 
for example rules on national treatment, which required equivalent treatment for foreigners and nationals. 
Furthermore these conventions did not apply to states that had not endorsedthem.123 
Before the Uruguay round, about 50 countries did; not grant patent protection for pharmaceutical products 
and some only granted process patents. This allowed them to manufacture products patented elsewhere by 
alternative processes. This mainly included many of the developing countries such as India and Egypt.124 
Availability of cheaper substitutes limited the effective monopoly enjoyed by Originator companies. and 
brought prices dolNl'l dramatically. Ironically. most of the developed countries managed to improve their 
pharmaceutical industries using these measures. For example Switzerland only introduced patents when 
her pharmaceutical industry had reached a certain degree of development. On the other hand, In 1994, 123 
countries including the poor African nations signed the TRIPs agreement.125 Given the above, it follows that 
the TRIPs agreement was to bring a Significant change in the drug industry since it stipulates that patents 
are to be granted in all fields of technology without exclusion.126 
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3.5.2 Interpretation of the TRIPs Agreement 
The agreement seeks to ·strike a balance between the long term social objective of providing incentives for 
future inventions and creation, and the short term objective of allowing people to use existing inventions and 
creations."121"fhe Agreement makes the granting of patents obligatory. It requires all member states to give 
longer market exclusivity to all drugs with patents filed after 1995.128 The objective of the TRIPs agreement 
is to encourage inventive activity and foreign direct investment as well as technology transfer and activities 
associated with the commercialisation or marketing of an invention. It was felt that these effects 'M)uid 
mainly be reatised in developing countries. l29 
A patent is a title granted by the state in a specifIC country that gives exclusive rights over the manufacturing 
and use of an invention to the owner of this invention in that country, in exchange of the disclosure of the 
invention to the public. l30 Its social function is to stimulate innovation.t31 A patent is national and 
applications for patents must be filed in every country where protection is desired for a particular 
invention.132 This affects the pricing of drugs and consequently access to medicines. The patent of a new 
drug is expected to last for 20 years before other cheaper generic drugs can be produced. It is clear that 
patent protection will allow research-based firms to enjoy monopoly power,' thereby creating monopolies, 
which result in higher prices for consumers. 
3.5.3 Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection, R&D and 
Innovation 
Proponents of strong IPR in particular patent protection presume a link between strong patent protection 
and R&D and innovation in the pharmaceuticalindustry.133 The industry'is viewed as an exceptional 
textbook case "where patents are considered an important mechanism of appropriability of economic 
outcomes of innovation." 134 Intellectual property protection is believed to give incentives to inventors and 
creators since they expect to receive some future benefits from their innovations. This encourages new 
inventions, for example new drugs, whose development costs are in most cases very high, hence private 
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rights will also result in social benefits.13S It is argued that in the absence of such protection they will be 
under investment in research by profit-making firms as opposed to social optimum outcome.l36 
It is clear that the message proponents are trying to send home is that in the absence of patent protection 
they will be no R&D. This is because pharmaceutical R&D is characterised by high R&D sunk cost of about 
$300 600 miUion for each new product.137 This accounts for more than 30% of the total costs of developing, 
producing and marketing the product Additionally production of pharmaceuticals has a low marginal cost; 
once the products exist they are relatively easy to produce. This facilitates the production of generics at 
costs way below the costs of producing the patented product. Consequently in the absence of patent 
protection generic manufacturers can always enter the market and bid down prices to marginal cost. Since 
marginal cost cannot cover the fIXed costs of R&D, then R&D is likely to fall, resulting in a reduction in 
number of new products launched onto the market by research based industries. l38 
Generally, although patent laws tend to benefit innovators they are not enough on their own to encourage 
innovation in settings where innovation capabilities are very low or absent altogether. This is supported by a 
study done by Lacetera and Orsengio of the interplay between policy regimes and technological regimes In 
US and Europe. Consequently innovation is likely to be sustained and promoted by high degrees of 
appropriability in high innovative and competitive settings as opposed to environments where little or no 
innovation takes place. Incentives to innovate are magnified by patents but they are not created where 
competencies to innovate are lacking. If competence is minima~ in developing countries, it implies that IPR 
will not have the expected effect of improving developing countries' abilities to undertake R&D and 
Innovation to a global standard.139 
3.5.4 Expected Impact of the TRIPs Agreement 
There are many cited advantages of patent protection, which among others Include Increase in R&D, 
increase in access to medicines in domestic markets from foreign markets, decrease in inefficient local 
production and decrease in domestic monopoly.140 Nevertheiess, depending on the environment in which a 
country exists, these benefits mayor may not be realised. Most developing countries were unenthusiastic 
about signing this agreement because they recognised that there was high concentration of drug production 
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in developed countries and innovation was almost entirely undertaken in these countries. During the time of 
negotiations, about 96% of worldwide R&D was done in developed countries and only 4% in all fields of 
science and technology was done in developing countries.141 
Evidence from recent studies has shown that if patents are introduced in a monopolistic market. they sustain 
monopolistic prices and greater loss is realised if they are introduced in an already competitive markets. 
This is especially true for many developing countries. Patented drugs by definition have no close 
substitutes, hence, demand may tend to be less sensitive to prices due to lack of alternative treatroont of 
equivalent quality and effectiveness.142 After a patent has expired its price is suppose to drop because 
generic drugs are suppose to appear. However, the ability of local companies to produce manufactured 
copies depends on the number of domestic companies. In many developing countries, where the number of 
such companies is small. there would only be competition among trans-national companies. Moreover local 
companies heavily depend on external sources for raw materials; consequently, only 10% of the· total 
production value comes from local companies. This leads to a creation of monopoly by trans-national 
companies. Even before the signing of the agreement. economic studies done by the World Bank showed 
that patent protection for medicines in developing countries would result in,. increase in medicines prices, 
increase in royalty and profit payments overseas and would lead to a larger market infiltration by foreign 
firmS.143 
Itt study done by Watal and Borell found that, although patents promoted local availability of new drugs,they 
resulted in higher prices for these drugs on the whole. In this study, market exclusivity increased average 
prices by 32%. and firms doubled the average prices when patents ~re available.144 TRIPs will delay the 
introduction and production of legal generic medicines by ten years or more in those countries that fonnerly 
restricted patenting of medicines. Medicines prices would be up to three or more times higher than they 
would otherwise be, during this period. These prolonged high prices would lead to a reduction in access to 
essential medicines and consequently unnecessary death and suffering.145 
Evidence from several case studies does not support the notion that the introduction of TRIPs compUant 
standards of IPR would encourage transfer of technology, encourage foreign direct investment, strengthen 
R&D and innovation and ensure early introduction of new medicines. If evidence on transfer of technology 
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from industrialised countries to developed countries is limited, it follows that the knowledge gap between the 
south and the west may increase if this transfer does not materialise. '46 This is so because innovation and 
R&D will only take place in developed countries and not transferred to the developing countries. This would 
lead to an increase in technological know-how in industrialised countries and none in developing countries. 
Also, the bargaining power would be biased towards the producers of knowledge who are in the developed 
world. This Yleak bargaining power in negotiating prices with monopoly suppliers would have strong effects 
on distribution especially with respect to patents effect on the prices of medicines. '47 Moreover the 
introduction of new medicines would be delayed thereby creating an impression of denying people the right 
to new drugs. Furthermore a shift in the market share from generics to branded products would be 
eVident, 148 , 
Drug firms in the developed world are concerned with focusing R&D efforts on problems that have lucrative 
markets; for example impotence and obesity rather than widespread tropical diseases that have smaller 
markets. Little R&D has been undertaken in countries that have widespread tropical diseases. Hence, when 
markets are small, there is little R&D in medicines that treat tropical diseases. Consequently, there would be 
little technological transfer. Thus, the above evidence does not support the notion that Significant 
technological transfer would occur. 
It is also argued that domestic manufacturing would be crippled because the production of new medicines in 
developing countries is done through reverse engineering. It is only possible where patent law protects the 
process and not the product, since the patented product can be produced using an alternative process. 
Process and-product patents would also result in extension of monopoly protection through minor changes 
to existing medicines where the product patent has expired '49 
Thus requiring countries to enforce patents may result in companies charging exorbitant prices that the poor 
cannot afford. Although the price of drugs alone does not determine who gets access to health care, it was 
noted that the health expenditure of the world's poor is largely devoted to buying drugs, often through 
private outlets. So the price of essential drugs matters to poor people and to poor countries. 'SO For many 
developing countries the implementation of TRIPs necessitates resources and capabilities in excess of 
those already in existence. 
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3.5.5 Provisions/limitations of the TRIPs Agreement 
Essential drugs are more similar to public goods and access to them is a human right. The TRIPs 
agreement goes some way in realising this by allowing some safeguards to protect public health.151 Patent 
rights are subject to certain lim~ations as a result of· certain provisions contained in the TRiPs agreement 
which developing countries can make use of in order to buy or produce drugs at more affordable prices. 
These limitations are to be effected through national legislation. However, ~ will be shown that even in the 
presence of such provisions there are certain obstacles that may render these provisions ineffective. These 
exemptions should not unreasonably conflict with the explo~ion of the patent and should not prejudice the 
legitimate interest of the patent owner. The provisions include, the bola provision, compulsory licensing and 
parallel importation. 
3:5.5.1 Compulsory Licensing 
The govemment grants compulsory licenses without the consent of the patent holder. The license should be 
predominant~' for the supply of the domestic market but some exports are still possible. Compulsory 
licensees generally compensate the patent holder through payment of remuneration. The license keeps the 
patent holder in check by reminding himther that in case of abuse of rights or non-availability of the product, 
a third party can be allowed to use the invention, this prevents misuse of patent rights.152 The grounds for 
iSsuing such 'a license include public health reasons, emergency s~uations, epidemics, public non-
commercial uSe and to remedy antk:ompetitive practices. Such licenses serve as an important mechanism 
to encourage competition and increase the afford ability of drugs, without depriving the patent holder of 
reasonable compensation. This can increase the number of generic producers in the market153. 
The presence or absence of generic competition in the market is a key determinant of pricing levels. 
Generic drug manufacturers play an important role In bringing competition to pharmaceutical markets and 
Improving production efficiency, which would reduce prices further. A price comparison for HIVIAIDS 
medicines demonstrates that MNCs sell their medicines at higher prices than those of generic producers. 
For example, the US price of 3TC (lamivudine) marketed by Glaxo is US $3,271 (per patient per year) 
whilst Indian generic manufacturers, Cipla ltd. and Hetero Drugs lim~ed. offer their generic versions at US 
$190 and US $98, respectively per patient per year. In the case of Zer~ (Stavudine), the US price offered by 
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Bristol-Myers Squibb is US $3.589 (per patient per year) as compared to US $70 and US $41 for the generic 
versions by Cipla and Hetero.154 This point is further illustrated by Cipla's recent offer for a year's supply of a 
combination of these three anti-AIDS medicines for US $350-600. in contrast to US $10-15 thousand offered 
for the branded medicines for a year's supply. 
Therefore presence generic competition will result in the lowering of prices of medicines. For example, 
generic companies in Thailand market Fluconazole155 for US $0.29 and in India for US $0.64. This contrast 
with market prices for brand-name drugs, which are US $10.50 In Kenya, US $21 in Guatemala and (until 
recently) US $8.25 in South Africa. l56 
The Brazilian case offers another example. When the Brazilian govemment began generic production of 
AIDS drugs, the prices of comparable branded products dropped by 19%. The Brazilian govemment has 
been able to offer universal free treatment as a result of domestic production of AIDS drugs, making its 
AIDS programme one of the most successful. The AIDS death rate has been halved; this has enabled the 
country to save US $412 million from averted hospitalisations.157 
On the other hand, compulsory licensing may not be adequate in making.drugs affordable. The major 
Hmitation is that in practice, a country needs to have a phamJaCeutical industry, which is sophisticated 
enough in order to produce the medicines concerned. It should be in a pos~ion to achieve economies of 
scale so as to bring the price down to affordable levels. Many of the developing countries fail on both 
accounts.156 Hence, few developing countries are able to make use of compulsory licences to facilitate 
domestic generic production of patented drugs.159 
The solution might be to import from a generic manufacturers in countries with strong pharmaceutical 
sectors, but this is unlikely to be viable unless a compulsory license has also been issued in the exporting 
country. Even if it has been granted, the TRIPs agreement states that compulsory licensing can only be 
issued only if production is 'predominantly' for domestic needs, so the exporting country may breach the 
rules if it decides to export. The manner in which the TRIPs agreement is drafted further limits the scope for 
state action.160 Compulsory licenses can only be granted if the proposed user has made efforts to obtain a 
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license from the patentee on commercial grounds, and the patent holder is compensated. In addition, there 
should be a limit to the scope and duration of compulsory licenses. Moreover, no clear criteria exist for 
determining the public-health grounds that may limit the rights of patent holders. The threat of trade 
sanctions by dominant industrialised countries further cripples the position of developing countries' 
governments.161 
3.5.5.2 Bollr Provision 
A Bolar provision allows interested generic manufacturers to start the production of test-batches of the 
patented drugs (the "early working" of patented drugs) before the patent actually expires. This would reduce 
the delay of generics to enter the market after the expiration of the patent. and in so doing enhancing 
competition. Generic drugs can also be made available more rapldly.l62 On the other, hand developing 
countries are facing pressure from the USA to' prohibit "early working" in their patent laws. The US 
government is also demanding that company data submitted to regulatory authorities on the testing and 
effectiveness of new drugs be protected. This rule would result in further restrictions of legitimate generic 
competition. l63 
:3.5.5.3 Plrillelimportation 
This refers to the importation of medicines into a country from a third country without the authorisation of the 
patent holder, where the patent holder has marketed the product. This is usually done if the price the patent 
holder is charging, in the country concerned, is much higher than the price in the third country. This is only 
allowed if the option is included in the national legislation. The principle of exhaustion of rights is the 
underlying notion of parallel imports. The principle hinges 00 the assertion that; where the patent holder has 
been rewarded through the first sale or distribution of the product, they no longer have the right to control 
the use or resale of the prodUCt,I64 
Since the pharmaceutical industry generally sets prices differently throughout the world for the same 
medicines, it follows that parallel imports are of paramount importance for public health interests. Parallel 
importation of a patented medicine' will facilitate more patients in the importing country to get access to 
161 Oxfam (2001) 
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drugs. The patent owner 1N'Ouid still receive remuneration for patented invention in the country where the 
product is first SOld,lSS 
It important however to note that parallel importation has been used elsewhere (e.g. PhiHppines), hence this 
mechanism is not really govemed by the TRIPs agreement. Therefore, to some extent its use hinges upon 
national practice. 
Multinational phannaceutical companies that may seek to establish unifonn global prices at the highest 
possible level may discourage implementation of parallel importation. They 1N'Ouid then charge a single price 
worldwide consequently leading to an increase in the price thiilt may otherwise be charged in low-income 
countries. 166 To a certain extent, the evidence above -holds watef. However there is also some waDable 
evidence that shows that in many developing countries, the prices of the same medicines are much higher 
than in developed countries anyway. For example, the retail prices of 10 out of 13 commonly used drugs, for 
which comparable data is available, are higher in Tanzania, which has an annual per capita GNP of US 
$120, than in Canada with a per cap~a GNP of US $19.380. The average prices of drugs surveyed in South 
Africa are higher than in any of the 8 Westem European countries for which data is presented.1S7 
Implementation is also crippled by the absence of information on market prices for phannaceutical 
prod ucts. 1M 
In summary,: although the TRIPs agreement has certain safeguards in place that developing countries can 
use to protect public health, they are very diffICult for developing countries to implement. Most of them are 
not yet incorporated into their national legislation. Only a few countries have strong pharmaceutical sectors 
to make use of such safeguards through domestic production. Some developed countries (especially the 
US) are known to use political pressure and threat of trade sanctions to compel countries to endorse laws 
that are based on a highly restrictive interpretation of the agreement,l69 Additionally, most developing 
countries believe that the TRIPs agreement will put them at a disadvantage. They trust that they risk being 
pushed to the margin and cosmetic drugs will have preference at the expense of drugs for tropical diseases, 
this puts profits before people. The price of technological transfer becomes high, this blocks poor countries 
from the vibrant knowledge sector since multinationals are likely to dominate the global market. Therein lies 
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the need to review the TRIPs agreement and drug pricing so that their negative effects on drug affordabilily 
and access to health can be rectified. 
3.5.6 Country Experiences 
TRIPs principles only became enforceable recently, thus not that many studies have been undertaken to 
determine its impact so far. Nevertheless, in countries such as Chile, Columbia, Thailand and some other 
Andean countries, evidence has shown that foreign direct investment has not improved expect through 
acquisition of domestic companies by foreign companies. No new investments have been undertaken.170 
Additionally, most formulation plants have closed since foreign companies have decided not to produce 
'locally but rather to import. They are no longer working the patent in these countries granting the right. 
'Trade deficits increased because of replacement of local production by direct importation. Because of the 
acquisitions, there has been no clear technological transfer to local companies. In addition, technological 
transfer was never substantial in this industry because licence agreements means that the active ingredient 
is provided by the patent holder, but the patent holder does not provide 'the technological know-how for 
'producing the active ingredient. The licensee will just be formulating. In Italy, the prices of medicines 
increased by almost 200% and it became a net importer of medicines and experienced severe trade deficits. 
Tendency to import drugs relative to local production was evident in most of the countries where studies 
were undertaken, indicating that the patent law benefited foreign rather than local companies.171 
3.6 Mark-ups, Taxes, Duties and Exchange Rates 
Distributional costs also influence the price of drugs. These costs include costs of packaging, transport costs 
as well as import duties. Import duties are important In many developing countries where many countries 
are stili trying to protect their industries (infant industries) from outside competition. Therefore, tariffs for 
drugs from outside tend to be very high and consequently the prices of imported drugs are also high. 
Transport costs are a very signifICant factor in countries where petrol costs are skyrocketing; consequently 
these costs are transferred to the consumer through high mark-ups on drugs. 
Exchange rate variations playa significant role in supporting retail price differences across markets. This is 
especially true in countries with massive shortage of foreign currency (e.g. Zimbabwe) and together with the 
depreciation of many African countries' currencies; the costs of importing drugs have increased. A shortage 
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of foreign currency results in creation of black markets where currency is traded at higher than offICial rates. 
This implies that manufacturers and wholesalers have to source for their own foreign currency at unofficial 
rates in order to buy raw materials and drugs. Consequently, this would be fed into the final prices charged 
at the retail level. Depreciating currencies also have the same effect in that they make imports relatively 
more expensive than before the currency depreciated. This would increase the prices of most raw materials 
and other essentials, for example fuel. This would result in an increase in prices of all other local products 
including drugs as a result of increasing operating and input costs of most firms.172 Developing countries 
import almost 90% of their raw materials.173 This has resulted in high mark ups for drugs. 
Sales tax on drug contributes to the final price charged by the percentage of the tax . rate. In developing 
countries, pharmacies also charge a fIXed dispensing fee for all the drugs sold. For example in Zimbabwe 
there is a fixed dispensing fee of 7)N $100 per pack. 
3.1 Competitive Tendering 
Competitive tendering is a demand side intervention perceived to be onaot best ways to acquire drugs of 
< good quality at low prices.174 The state gives contracts to suppliers for the exclusive right to supply a fixed 
volume of the drugs at a fixed price for a stipulated period of time. Competitive bidding by both local and 
. foreign suppliers ensures that the government gets the lowest possible prices for drugs. The government is 
also able to command large discounts due to bulk purchasing. On the other hand, manufacturers who fail to 
get contracts may cease trading or leave the market as a result. This could reduce competition and thus 
increase prices. This is usually true in countries with comprehensive national health services. However, this 
unlikely in countries where the private sector plays a central role since suppliers can still supply the private 
sector. In cases where competitive tendering poses such problems, the government can opt to have more 
than one contract running concurrently but for different quantities of the drug.175 
3.8 Conceptual Approach to Medicine Pricing 
Pharmaceutical pricing is not only determined by forces of supply and demand in the market place of buyers 
and sellers like under the ideal perfect competition scenario. On the contrary. different buyers and sellers 
have varying degrees of bargaining and negotiating power, which in the end can skew prices of medicines in 
172 This is known as imported inflation resulting in cost-push inflation. 
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--favour of that side with the highest negotiating poVllef.176 Economic theory and research has come up with a 
conceptual-approach to understanding price influences in the drug market. The basic approach has been 
price discrimination and monopoly and these two to some extent offer some insight into understanding the 
players in the drug market and consequently influences of medicine pricing. 
3.8.1 Price Discrimination 
, This concept assumes that sellers have the ability of segmenting the market into two groups, and can 
distinguish them by their responsiveness to price: those who are sensitive to price changes and those who 
are less sensitive. Sellers can then charge different prices in different markets. However, this model breaks 
: down in the presence of many sellers since consumers can shop around for priceS.177 Yet, if multinationals 
Vllere to come together and agree on a single price in those markets that are more responsive to prices there 
could be progress towards price discrimination. Additionally mechanisms can be put in place to prevent 
spillovers back into the country of origin where consumers are less sensitive to price changes. 
'; 3.8.2 Mbnopoly 
. Monopoly is an extreme case where there is only one seller and many buyers, Due to lack of compet~ion 
the monopolist is able to charge a price above marginal 'cost and restricts output. This results in 
supernormal profits. On the other hand this model can be modified if VIle relax the assumption of a single 
- seller. In the market for drugs there are relatively few large seUers who can form a market structure called 
an oligopoly. These firms have significant influence over the price in the market. They charge the highest 
. possible price consistent with their profit motive.178 
The above conceptual approach to price determination can be modified to allow other factors that influence 
drug prices to come in. Additionally it has become common knowledge in economics that increase in prices 
would imply that people would tend to demand less of the drug. This does not hOVilever imply that the good 
has become unimportant in one's life. It is because it is now out of their reach or beyond their means and 
vice versa if the price of the good falls. The final price is therefore determined by supply side and demand 
side factors together with the degree of negotiating poViler of all the players in the market. The conceptual 
176 Cantor (1998) 
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framework below puts into perspective how these factors influence prices and consequently affordable 
access to drugs. 
figure 3: Conceptual framework 
Supply and Demand side 
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The above framework brings the following to light, patents, generic competition, competijive tendering, 
distributional costs, taxes, tariffs and exchange rates affect the pricing of drugs eijher directly or indirectly. 
Furthermore, each company takes into consideration the price of the patent-protected competition into 
consideration before establishing ijs "launch price". Thus, new drugs for which loose substitutes exist are 
usually priced lower than they would otherwise be in the absence of competition. This profit maximisation 













is a pioneer drug then the manufacturer can enjoy monopoly status and can price its drug accordingly. But 
this status is enjoyed subject to oligopolistic competition from new substitutes.179 
The presence of large buyers also puts constraints on the prices that manufacturers can charge. This is 
achieved through competitive tendering by govemment stores, which purchases large quantities through 
tendering and sourcing for the best price possible. Generic producers, as noted earlier, price their products 
lower than those already in the market and as more and more generics come in the price of generics win 
drop even further. Although generic entry does not necessarily lead to a fall in prices of pioneer drugs, it 
leads to a lower weighted average price of medicines in the markel,ISO Distributional costs, taxes and tariffs 
influence the price in that they increase the price by percentage of the taxltariff levied or by the percentage 
mark-up. Exchange rates influences the final price of medicines in that if the exchange rate depreciates 
irnported drugs and raw materials become more expensive. The price d locally produced drugs win also 
increase because of the increase in the costs of obtaining raw materials and vice-versa if the exchange rate 
appreciates. The same results are also expected in the presence of unofficial market exchange rates. In 
such cases, firms will have to source for foreign currency (to buy raw materials and import drugs) at 
exchange rates way above the prevailing offICial market rates. This usually occurs in the presence of foreign 
currency shortages (foreign currency crisis) in a particular country. 
Affordability of medicines by both the consumers and the government is a function of the final price charged 
to the government and the consumers, the financial resources devoted to purchasing medicines by the 
government and the income of households/individuals. The final price charged to both the consumers and 
the government. individuaVhousehold income and the financial resources available to purchase medicines 
determine how much consumers/government would demand. The final amount of medicines demanded to 
some extent reflects how much consumers/government can afford to purchase. Affordability is one of the 
most important factors that determine degree of access to affordable drugs. Only by considering how the 
above factors interact and influence each other can one draw policy implications, recommendations and 
identify gaps and areas that may require further investigations and research. 
179 Cantor (1998), Boston consulting group (1993), Schweitzer and Comanor (1996) 
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~ CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND DATAl 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines a detailed description of the methodology used to conduct the study at both data 
collection and data analysis levels. The chapter will first look at the data collection instruments used during 
the field survey to collect data from different sources. The chapter will then give a detailed overview of the 
variables used, the data sources and the data collection procedures used in this study. A brief look at the 
method used to analyse the data will also be outlined. Finally the section identifies some research problems 
associated with the study and it also outlines some biases and limitations that should be taken into account 
when conducting such a study. 
The study was carried out in Harare the capital city of Zimbabwe. The data collection was done dUl"lng 4-5 
weeks in February and March 2002. The method was described in a written instruction; this instruction also 
included the necessary information on the drugs and what data to collect. Information on drugs and their 
prices and information on duties, taxes and mark-ups were collected from nine pharmacies, the main 
referral hospital, five wholesalers and five manufacturers. Interviews were also carried out with key 
informants from the ministry of health, African Regional International Property Office (ARIPO), Patents 
Office, Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAl) and manufacturing companies. 
4.2 The Study Population 
, The study population comprised of all pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies in the 
capital city of Zimbabwe. The population also included all key informants from manufacturing companies, 
the Ministry of Health, MCAl, ARIPO and the Patents Office. Additionally, the population also comprised of 












4.3 Data Collection Instruments 
The data collection instruments that 'Here used comprised of the following: 
a) Structured survey forms 
These 'Here spread sheets used to collect quantitative information on prices, mark-ups, dosage forms, 
strengths and un~ packs for different drugs. 
b) Semi-Structured questions 
These questions 'Here used in conducting structured qualitative (audio recorded) in-depth interviews with 
key Informants. The semi-structured questions acted as interview guides, and they ensured that all key 
questions 'Here covered and that interviews were kept on track. The questions covered specific issues in 
areas of interest. Furthermore, these semi-structured questions were complemented by follow up questions 
, for clar~ where necessary. 
c) Documents 
Certain documents with relevant information for the study 'Here obtained. This included, the patents act, the 
medicine and allied control act, the drug register, the drug legislation/regulation guidelines, EDlIZ, the drug 
policy, the health strategy and the patents amendment bill. Additionally data on drug prices and dosage 
forms from comparison countries were obtained from other studies. 
4.4 Identification of Variables, Sampling Procedures, Dala Source and Data Collection 
Procedures 
A basket of 35 different drugs in total 'Here selected of which 13 of them are antiretroviral drugs and 22 of 
them are used to treat opportunistic infections. The selection was made based on essential~ and 
availabil~ of drugs that treat HIV/AIDS/opportunistic infections and their patent status. Firstly, a drug 
register was obtained from MeAl to determine which drugs are registered and approved to marketed in 
Zimbabwe. This was also complemented with information from EDUZ. The EDUZ made it possible to 
identify essential generic drugs used for opportunistic infections. Unfortunately no antiretroviral drugs 












the drug register. With the help of doctors and pharmacists, a drug checklist of the most important drugs that 
are used to treat HIV/AIDSlopportunistic infections and their patent status in Zimbabwe was drawn up as 
shown in table 3 and 4 below. This served as a guide when colleting data on prices, taxes, duties and mark-
ups. All the drugs in table 3 and 4 are prescribed widely in both developing and developed countries. 
Table 3: Drugs used in the treatment of opportunistic infections and their patent status 
Table 4: Drug. used in the treatment of HIVIAIDS and their patent statui 
Prices were collected from pharmacieS, wholesalers, manufacturing companies and one central hospital in 
Harare. A list of all registered premises was obtained from the MeAl. From this list, only manufacturers 
wholesalers and pharmacies in the capital city Harare were selected. FIVe major manufacturers were 
purposefully selected for interviews. Five wholesales were selected based on whether they sold at least 
some antiretroviral drugs, and among the fIVe, was government stores (Natpharm), which represents the 
public sector. The selection of pharmacieS was based first on those that sold at least more than two 
antiretroviral drugs. This scaled down the pharmacies to 30. However, of the thirty pharmacies only nine 
were willing to give out information on drugs they sold, mark-ups, taxes and prices. For each drug, the price, 












addition. the infonnation above was also obtained from the major referral hospital in the country 
(Parerenyatwa). Infonnation on mark-ups, discounts received. exchange rates, official duties and taxes was 
also collected from manufacturers, wholesalers, the department of central.statistics and the central bank. 
This information would be used to estimate the final price paid by patients in the private and public sector. 
All prices were listed in local currency and then converted to US dollars using the average exchange rate for 
March 2002. 
Information on patent status was obtained from the Patents Office and from ARIPO. and this was 
complemented with information from documents that were electronically accessed from the Internet. The 
drug patenting guidelines were obtained from ARIPO and from the patents act. 
It is important to note that there is no formal/direct price regulation for drugs in Zimbabwe, hence, there are 
no fonnal price regulation laws. However there are certain policies in place that indirectly control such 
prices. These polices include the tendering system and control of import duties on essential drugs and raw 
materials used in the production of these drugs. In addition to the above, since there is a problem of parallel 
market exchange rates in Zimbabwe (This was sited as one of the contributors to high drug prices in 
Zimbabwe). NatPharm gets all its foreign currency at official market rates. Furthermore, the drug policy 
encourages all government hospitals to prescribe/sell generics rather than branded products. This 
information was collected from the ministry of health, where documents on the national drug policy were 
obtained. This infonnation was also acquired through recorded interviews With the chief phannacists at the 
ministry of health and from the procurement manager of NatPhann. 
A recorded interview was conducted with the director of MCAZ to obtain information regarding the 
implementation of the TRIPs agreement into the law system. This interview was guided by structured 
questions and the director was also given a chance to contribute some of his own views with regard to the 
.TRIPs agreement. An attempt was made to try and find out what the MCAZ perceived were the likely impact 
of the agreement. A report on the proposed patents amendment bill, the amendment biD and the medicines 
allied substance control act was also obtained. 
Since the TRIPs agreement is yet to be implemented, only the likely impacts of the provisions/safeguards 
such as parallel importation. Bolar provision and compulsory licensing. can be estimated based on other 
studies and experiences from other countries. These documents were obtained from ARIPO and MOO. 
Information on negotiated procurement and generic competition was obtained through structured interviews 












and the chief phannacist from Ministry of Hea~h. Documents on national drug policy, guidelines for drug 
donations and the national health strategy for Zimbabwe were obtained ·fonn the Ministry of Health. In 
addition data on exchange rates. and data on income and expenditure survey were also obtained. 
Information on background of health sector, AIDS policies and the phal1T'laCeutical industry was obtained 
through structured tape-recorded interviews with the director of the MeAl, the marketing directors five 
manufacturing companies. Interviews were also conducted with key infonnant fonn the national AIDS 
control programme in order to obtain infonnation on the national AIDS policy in Zimbabwe. Documents on 
the national hea~h profile were also obtained from the Ministry of Health. 
Data cleaning occurred through out the collection process by reviewing the data collected in order to check 
for inconsistencies, errors and omissions in recording responses. Such issues were corrected immediately. 
4.5 Analysis of Data 
• Data analysis was done using Stata and Excel computer software. Results were presented in fonn of simple 
tables and graphs and a quantitative descriptive analysis was conducted to establish the relationship 
between prices and other variables in question. Example of outputs from these tables includes average 
prices for all drugs and average prices for dual therapy in different countries. Graphs· were also used to 
compare prices between countries and between the public and the private sector, etc. Further more a 
detailed analysis was conducted to establish the relationship between patents and prices, impact of 
competitive tendering on prices, contribution of taxes, duties and mark-ups to the final consumer prices and 
how generic competition influences the prices of drugs. Finally, two sensitivity analyses were conducted, 
firstly to show how black market rates could have contributed to high drug prices. Secondly a sensitivity 
analysis assuming parallel importation was also undertaken to show that prices of antiretroviral drugs would 
fall substantially in the presence parallel importation. A brief assessment of the effect of final end user prices 












4.6 Data problems 
Like with most survey studies, certain research problems were encountered. It is also important to highlight 
the likely biases and limitations to the study at hand. These limitations should be taken into account when 
drawing conclusions and interpreting results. 
4.5.1 Research Problems 
During data collection, it was evident that not all key informants were well conversant with the TRiPs 
agreement. Consequently, some did not understand how it would affect their day-to-day running of the 
business in the pharmaceutical industry and how it would impact 00 public heafth systems in the country. 
This made it difficult to get information 00 how the TRIPs agreement would be implemented into the law 
system. With regard to prices of drugs, out of the thirty pharmacies that were sampled only ten pharmacies 
were willing to give information with regard to prices and mark-ups and information on dosage forms and 
strength, this reduced the sample size drastically. Information on change in prices overtime could not be 
obtained readily because prices of drugs changed every time new stock was received and fluctuated 
depending on the exchange rate (either the official or the unofficial rate) that prevailed when the drugs were 
purchased. Consequently, one may find that the same drug in a particular retail outlet from different 
suppliers has different prices. In addition, most companies only got computerised recently; hence, such data 
was not captured on an on going basis. 
4.5.2 Biases and limitations 
A recent article by Danzoo and Kim found that cross-national study results are highly sensitive to 
methodological choices. Comparing prices between countries is inherently diffICult because of problems 
encountered when comparing official exchange rates, parallel market exchange rates and real currency 
values. Sample selection, unit of measurement for price and volume and the relative weight given to 
consumption pattems in the countries being compared contribute to the sensitivity of results. t81 Also 
differences in pharmaceutical distribution channels (private versus public sector, retail versus wholesale) 
and different strengths and pharmaceutical dosages as well as price fluctuations over time make 
comparisons between countries and between the private and public sector difficult. 












A selection bias is created especially when price comparisons are done for few-selected top selling drugs 
that are patented, since certain drugs available in one country may not be available in another.182 Moreover, 
when drugs that have been approved and marketed in two countries for example, become accepted therapy 
in one country but not in the comparator country, huge disparities in market share, and consequently prices, 
for similar medicines may result.183 
Dosage form, strength or pack size may differ across countries. This compels researchers to impute prices 
for missing product strengths or dosage forms based on per unit prices. This can lead to biased price 
comparisons if unit prices are by and large lower for large package sizes. 1M This applies to both domestic 
comparisons and cross-country comparisons. Different utilisation rates between countries under comparison 
create a bias in price comparisons because price levels vary with volume. Prices for drugs that are not 
frequently prescribed are usually higher. This implies, for example that a popular drug in the US may appear 
more expensive in other countries, consequently this results in an upward bias in medicine prices in the 
comparator country ,185 
Another source of bias could come from currency conversions. For example in this study when the price 
data was collected there was the problem of parallel market rates. Some drugs were imported at black 
market exchange rates, which were about 5.5 times higher than official exchange rates. However, not all 
drugs were purchased with foreign currency obtained at this rate. If a wholesaler is lucky they can source 
currency at a lower rate or even at the official rate. This problem could be solved to some extent by taking 
the average price. On the other hand an upward bias in prices could still be present and this would pose 
some problems when doing cross-country comparisons. 
Lack of uniformity in cooperate pricing policies across different markets makes comparison between prices 
for patented drugs and generic equivalents difficult. Additionally, the national legislation and the terms on 
which the TRIPs agreement is implemented could also have an important bearing on the price outcomes. l86 
In short, methodological problems can make meaningful comparisons diffICult since different methods 
produce different results. Thus, it is important that future research should test the robustness of results to 
182 One could end up with a very small sample of few selected drugs that are available in both countries. 















alternative assumptions with respect to types of drug products compared, their relative importance with 
regard to domestic consumption, and how they are priced by making use of sensitivity analyses.1l17 
4.1 Ethics 
In collecting the data certain ethics were taken into consideration. Certain interviewees asked not to be 
quoted; this will be taken into consideration in this paper. Furthermore, care was taken to make sure that 
information that was confidential from certain institutions and organisation was not revealed to other parties. 
During the interviews, participants Irespondents were first informed about the purpose of the interview and 













5 !Chapter 5: The Pham1aceuticallndultry in Zimbabw~ 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the pharmaceutical industry in Zimbabwe. It focuses on how the 
industry operates. the key players and reviews the drug distribution system and procurement. It will also 
look at how the TRIPs agreement is implemented into the law system. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
price regulation system in Zimbabwe and the likely impact of the TRIPs agreement on the industry as 
perceived by the key players. 
5.2 Background of the Sector 
The Zimbabwean pharmaceutical industry is solely a generic manufacturing industry. in other words it, is a 
derivative market of research· based companies. Its success therefore depends on the success of foreign 
multinational companies. If the multinationals do not come up with super blockbuster drugs. then it means 
that the local industry will not have any drugs to copy and manufacture. The industry relies on imminent 
patent expiry in order to come up with new generic versions of branded drugs. Thus, there are no locally 
manufactured drugs that are patented.l88 
In previous years, Pfizer and Glaxo Smith Kline were the only two multi-national companies in Zimbabwe. At 
the moment however there are no multinational companies in Zimbabwe. They all disinvested as a result of 
the economic recession that is currently being experienced in the country. The country has been going 
though an economic recession for the past four years. However. most multinationals have local agents that 
import from multinationals based in other countries for example South Africa, Denmark, Germany, India, 
Switzerland and Canada. le9 CAPS and Varichem are two of the major local pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and they are both registered with the South African Medicines Control Council (MCC). which has some of 
the most stringent quality requirements in pharmaceutical manufacturing. This in itself shows that the 
industry is keeping up with international quality standards in terms of pharmaceutical production. 
The manufacturers in the industry as a whole try to protect themselves from competition from other 
competitors. They are generally not too keen on giving out information with regard to profits, sales volumes, 
market share and consumption patterns to the public. Such strict polices make it difficult for the department 













of central statistics to publish data with regard to the above. As a result data on profits, sales volumes, 
market share and pharmaceutical consumption patterns in Zimbabwe is very scarce if any is available to the 
public. The rival firms have felt that giving away such information is not a competitive strategy since one will 
be making available information to other rival companies that they could use to outlast the firm that has 
made its information pUblic.190 
The prices of the local manufacturers for drugs differ depending on whether they are selling to the private or 
public sector. This is as a result of the tendering procurement method used by NatPharm. When NatPharm 
goes to tender, it asks for large volumes of medicines and it ask as many manufacturers as possible to give 
them the best quotation for the medicines. It follows that, the prices that NatPharm receives for drugs for 
onward distribution to govemment hospitals, mission hospitals and council hospitals are in most cases a 
third of the prices that manufacturers charge to the private sector. This is because of the economies of scale 
involved when manufacturing large volumes of medicines/drugs for one custorner.191 Manufacturers tend to 
view this as a project in its own right. and hence they totally isolate the project from their everyday business. 
They have a profit motive when producing for the private sector, however, when they produce for tender, 
they will be looking at capacity utilization in the factory. In most cases, they would have not budgeted for 
these volumes; therefore they win not be trying to recover all their expenses. Thus, these prices will tend to 
be much lower than the prices charged in the private sector. Most companies view tenders as a way of 
mopping up excess capacity in the firm.192 
The total consumption of pharmaceuticals was estimated to be US $50 million in 2000, however because of 
escalating inflation and rise in costs of pharmaceutical products this has probably shrunk to about US $45-
40 million. The local indUstry does not only produce for the domestic market but also for export purposes. 
Varichem's estimated turnover for this year is about a billion lYI dollars and last years turnover was lYI $ 
550 billion. Its market share is quite substantial and their export volume is about 15%-20% of their turnover. 
CAPS' market share is about 30%-35% In therapeutic areas where it is actively competing in terms of 
pharmaceutical products. However, if one takes the total consumption Including therapeutic areas where 
they are not competitive, its market share comes down to about 15°/0-13%. CAPS' export contribution to the 
turnover is about 20%-30% of their annual tumover. Their major exporter is South Africa and It accounts for 
40% of their exports. Other major export markets for the industry include Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, 
Namibia, lesotho, Swaziland, Mauritius and Uganda. l93 
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Contrary to the general view that few if any of the African countries have industries with the capacity to 
produce generic antiretroviral drugs, the local manufacturers argue that they have enough capacity to 
produce their own generics to meet local demand. Some of the manufacturers already have started batch 
production; they are only waiting to find means and ways to circumvent the issues surrounding patent 
formulation laws. However countries like India are able to produce generic antiretroviral drugs because they 
do not have to respect patents on formulation until 2005.194 
5.2.1 The key Players 
There are eight local active pharmaceutical manufacturers in the country. These form an association called 
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Zimbabwe. The prime objective of this association is to 
look out for the interests of the pharmaceutical manufacturers in terms of how they relate with the authorities 
with regard to licensing and registration of products and relationship with other key players in the industry. It 
also acts as a lobby group with regards to issues where the manufacturers need a collective voice. It 
represents the industry's interests to the MeAl. It is also self-regulating as to what sort of conduct it expects 
from its members,i95 
There is only one pharmaceutical company listed on the stock exchange. This means that the 
state/government. individual shareholders, banks and foreign companies can buy stock. Datlabs and other 
manufacturers are not listed hence they are independently owned. Additionally, foreign-based companies or 
local companies own most of the wholesalers. There are relatively few manufacturers in the industry, in 
other words they operate more or less like an oligopoly. The manufacturers association facilitates this since 
they can lobby to sell within stipulated prices. However, this market structure is difficult to sustain since local 
manufacturers also face intense competition from foreign manufacturers. 
About 60% of pharmaceuticals consumed in the country are manufactured locally and about 40% is 
imported. There are also drug importers who import finished products, which in most cases are innovator 
brands that are still under patent. The drug importers are agents for multi-national companies like Pfizer, 
Glaxo-Wellcome and Roche. They belong to an association called Ethical Drug Association. There are also 
a number of local wholesalers. They buy from local and foreign manufacturers and most of them are 
194 Ibid 












representatives of outside companies. NatPharm is also a major key player a wholesaler for the 
government. NatPharm also imports medicines on tender from foreign organizations. 
On the retail side there are about 220 retail pharmacy outlets in both the urban and rural areas, which sell 
prescription medicines, and over the counter drugs to the private public. They ali belong to the Retail 
Pharmacy Association of Zimbabwe. local supermarkets also play a role in that they also sell over the 
counter medicines. In the public sector, individuals interface with dispensaries at government and mission 
hospitals. Any new drug that has to be sold has to be registered, licensed and approved by the MCAZ.l96 
The approval system will be discussed later below. 
5.2.2 The Distribution Chain System 
The national drug policy in Zimbabwe aims at ensuring safe, cost effective and efficient distribution of drugs 
and other medical supplies to the entire country. In addition, it aims to guarantee that drugs are aVlillble 
and accessible to aU those who need them at all time. It is the responsibility of the ministry of health to 
ensure the provision and maintenance of adequate, efficient and ap ropriate transportation, communication 
and personnel required for drug distribution at all levels of health care.197 
Drug provision to patients involves complex, system of drug distribution which consists of various players 
such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, third-party administrators, pharmacy benefit 
management companies, managed care organizations, and other providers of health care. All the players 
take part in the pricing of drugs as either purchasers or providers. The distribution chain in the country is 
iHustrated in figure 4 below. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers tend to attract enormous attention because they are perceived as the most 
profitable link in the distribution chain. Since manufacturers in Zimbabwe are generic producers, they price 
their products as any other commodity trying to gain market share through lower pnceS. l98Drug wholesalers 
function as 'middlemen' between the drug manufacturers and the retail pharmacies. The wholesalers 
provide a very useful purpose to independent and chain pharmacies as they purchase in very large amounts 
and then distributes in small portions. Pharmacies are relieved from the burden of dealing with each 
196 Phannaceutical Manufacturers (2002) 
197 Minisby of Health and Child Welfare (1995) 












individual manufacturer for every purchase. 1ft While there are still a number of wholesalers in operation. the 
top fIVe wholesalers account for a substantial share of the entire wholesale drug market. This intense 
purchasing allows these few wholesalers to have influence over drug pricing in the distribution chain.- In 
addition there are also independent importers who play a similar role as the wholesalers. The only 
difference is tbat the act as agencies of multi-national firms and import drugs from outside the country for 
local distribution. Importers have to be registered with MCAl and all the drugs they import also have to be 
registered with MCAl. 
figure 4: Channels of Distribution for Drugs 
Supermarkets 
e.g. OK and TM 
Manufacturers (local and 
foreign) 
e.R. CAPS and R.oche 
Hospitals e.g. Parerenyatwa 
Physicians 
Long term-care Facilities 
Independent and chain pharmacies and supermarkets characterize the retail level in the distribution chain. 
Due to recent economic hardships in the country, the number of pharmacies has shrunk a bit. Chain 
pharmacies are able to command volume discounts from manufacturers/wholesalers and to contract directly 
199 Smith (1975) 












with managed care organizations for exclusive distribution rights because of their ability to move large 
market shares of drug products. 201 
Government hospitals, municipality cUnics and mission hospitals in most cases buy their drugs from 
NatPharm. He'llever, they can in some instances source their own drugs from either private wholesalers or 
directly from manufacturers if need be. Physicians, private pharmacies and private hospitals also buy from 
private wholesalers or directly from manufacturers. Hospitals, physicians and pharmacies then distribute 
these drugs to the final consumers (patients). In addition it is important to note that the number of key 
players within the distribution chain increases as one moves down the distribution chain, i.e. there are fe'ller 
manufacturers compared to wholesalers and retail outlets. 
5.2.3 Public Sector Drug Procurement 
NatPharm under takes public procurement. Drug availability has recently become a major problem due to 
financial constraints and foreign currency constraints. HO'IIeVer the procurement process does not only 
involve NatPharm but other departments. clients and other agencies. Collaboration of these players is 
required if effective and efficient procurement is to be realized. The whole procurement process rests on 
policies that seek to create and support the public commitment to essential drug supply. The system seeks 
to deliver the correct drugs to patients who need them. There is need for a viable organisational structure, 
adequate financing and good management for the procurement process to function effectively.202 
Figure 5 below summarizes the procurement cycle in the public sector. The Public sector uses the tendering 
system as a method of procurement to obtain drugs and medical supplies. The procurement cycle is truly a 
cycle because each major function builds on the previous function and leads logically to the next. The 
amount of medicines required for the whole country in the public sector is estimated in quantification stage. 
This quantifJCation follows from rational selection based on real experience with drug use and health needs. 
There is need to review the prevalent health problems, identify treatment choices, identify the drugs and 
dosage forms relevant to pattern of prevalent diseases203 and deciding which medicines are to be dispensed 
at each level of health care.204 
201 Ibid 
202 World Bank Group (2002) 
203 The drugs chosen should be of proven adequate quality, and should be safe and effective. 












The committee will then meet to prepare and draft the tender documents and specifies the terms and 
conditions for the tender. The tender is then advertised in newspapers and joumals to ensure that it reaches 
all potential bidders. Bids are then opened and closed at NatPharm and the tender board assesses the 
tenders. The awards are then approved and the contracts are issued to the organizations, which win the 
bids. The drugs are then registered if they have not already been registered and suppliers are then paid up. 
The drugs are then supplied and distributed to NatPharm. which will be responsible for distributing the 
medicines to various govemment hospitals. council clinics, mission hospitals and army hospitals.205 The 
goal is to maintain a sustainable supply of drugs to all facilities and at the same time ensuring that resources 
are being utilised in the most cost effective way.200 
In Zimbabwe, only drugs that are registered or authorized by the drug regulatory authority are procured for 
use in the public and private sectors. However, non-registered drugs for specific use can be procured by 
arrangement when deemed necessary. 
Figure 5: Public Sector Procurement Cycle 
Supply & distribution of drugs 
Issue contracts 
Source: Ministry of Health and Child Welfare 
205 Ministry of Health and child welfare 
206 World Bank Group (2002) 
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Priority in procurement is given to drugs in the EDLIZ in accordance with the VEN207 classification and to 
drugs used in other national programmes. Procurement is by generic name not brand name. Public 
procurement is done using anyone of these methods: pre-qualification of suppliers, open INOrtdwide general 
tenders and negotiated procurement or direct procurement (only in special Circumstance). First preference is 
however given to domestic manufacturers (with regard to tenders) depending on costs, quality, performance 
and reliability of supplies. Public sector dispensing is by generic name only and the MCAl enforces 
regulations on dispensing issues. AI drug donations regardless of the source are handled through 
NatPharm according to an the requirements applying to normal procurement procedures. Donations are 
normally accepted only for drugs included in the EDUZ.2Il8 
5.2.4 Medicine legislation and Approval System 
Early control of medicines around the 12th century was concerned with correct identity and freedom from 
adulteration or impurity. Many of these medicines were from crude vegetable drugs and fraud by 
substitution, adulteration or even falsifying weight by wetting material was not uncommon. Consequently, 
there was need to control medicines. Control of medicines is done through acts of parliament. Nevertheless, 
acts do not have in them a lot of detail but they empower the ministers to introduce rules and regulations, 
which are the nuts and bolts of legislation. In Zimbabwe, the legalisation was introduced in 1969, and the 
control of medicines in Zimbabwe is provided for under the Medicines and AHied Substances Control Ad 
(MASCA) and its regulations and the Dangerous Drugs Act (DDA) and its regulations.209 
The MASCA provides for: 
• Establishment of the medicines regulatory authority and the medicines control authority 
• Registration of drugs 
• licensing and control of premises and persons handling medicines 
• Control of clinical trials 
• Procedures for handling prohibited drugs and 
• General provisions.210 
The DDA provides for control of: 
• Production 
207 V stands for vital, E for essential and N for necessary. 
208 Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, (1995) 













• Importation and exportation 
• Possession and sale and 
• Distribution and use 
of dangerous drugs that are mostly narcotics and liable to abuse.211 
The govemment is also acceded to three intemational drug conventions namely 
• Single conventions on narcotic drugs, 1961 
• The convention of Psychotropic substances, 1911 and 
• United Nations convention against illicit traffIC in narcotic drugs and Psychotropic substance 1988 
These guarantee that substances under this control are kept in legal channels and to establish use for 
legitimate pUrposes.212 
The MeAl is comprised of 8-12 members and is the regulatory authority responsible for the approval, 
licensing and registration of drugs in ZimbabM. They receive and review applications for registration and 
the approval process takes between 3 to 5 months for most drugs before they can be approved to be sold 
on the market The criteria used in the approval process include, ensuring that drugs are safe and are of 
acceptable quality and that they offer effective treatment. In addition, approval is also based on availabUity, 
being in the public interest, and also the drug has to be registered in the country of origin. It costs a firm 
about US $800 to register each drug and in addition, the firm has to pay an annual fee of about US $1000 
for each item registered. If for example, a firm in the UK registers a certain drug, then wholesalers are not 
alloYled to buy this drug from any other manufacturer besides the one in the UK even if it is the same 
manufacturer in a different country. This in itself automatically makes parallel importation difficult,213 Only 
drugs that are registered with the MeAl are permitted to be imported, manufactured, wholesaled, retailed, 
prescribed, dispensed and supplied. The MeAl has procedures and polices for sampling, testing and 
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5.3 Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement into the law System 
The agreement has not yet been implemented in Zimbabwe because the Ministry of Health has not yet 
finished amending its legislation; hence it has not been made law yet. Zimbabwe has always been 
observing patent laws. However, this does not imply that the country became TRIPs compliant at 
independence. The country only chose to be TRIPs compliant ahead of the schedule. Nonetheless since the 
country has always been observing patents, changes within the legislation would mainly focus on the TRiPs 
provisions by incorporating these into the law system. As soon as the bill goes through parliament, the 
country will be TRiPs compliant. There are three provisions that are going to be included in the national 
legislation namely, the Bolar provision, compulsory licensing and parallel importation. 
5.3.1 Review of the Proposed Patents Amendment Bill 
The amendment of the Patents act (chapter 26:03) arises from the need to make certain that the legislation 
in Zimbabwe is TRiPs compliant. In addition there is need to make sure that suitable provisions are provided 
for, which will cater for the availability of medicines. However, the bill had not passed in parliament therefore 
was it was still open to comments. 
5.3.1.1 Compulsory licensing and Paraliellmportation 
Article 31 of the TRiPs agreement allows member countries to grand compulsory licenses on grounds 
deemed necessary by the member country. This provision allows the govemment to license one of its 
agencies the right to use a patent without consent of the patent holder. However, provision should be made 
to compensate the patent holder. The new section 31 empowers the Registrar of patents to grant 
compulsory licenses. This facilitates judicial matters to be solved on an administrative basis rather than 
through a cumbersome judicial tribunal process. The new section 31(9) provides for remuneration for 
compensation to the patent holder to be determined as a percentage of net sales. This should take into 
account the average royal rates usually paid in the sector or branch, product specifIC R&D costs and 
domestic market share of the total world market. 215 
Any person can apply for: 
a. A licence under the patent 












b. An entry to be made in the register to the effect that licences under the patent is to be 
available as a right or 
c. Where applicant is the state department, for the grant of any agency specified in the 
application, 
at any time after the expiration of 3 years from the date of grant of a patent on grounds where: 
• The patented invention is capable of being commercially wor1<:ed in Zimbabwe, that is not being wor1<:ed 
to the fullest extent or 
• Demand for the product is not being met or being met to a substantial extent through importation 
• The invention can be wor1<:ed in Zimbabwe but is being prevented by the importation of the product, 
• A national emergency exist or for public heaRh reasons or if it is in the public interest (e.g. security 
reasons) 
Furthermore, compulsory licences shall be issued predominantly for the supply of the domestic market 
except in cases of anti-competitive practices in which case such a restriction shall not apply.216 
Section 34 allows the use of patented inventions without the consent of the patent holder by the state,this 
will enable medicines to be imported or offered for sale without the permission of the patent holder. 
Importation of patented products that have been put on the mar1<:et in another country is alb'lled without the 
consent of the patentee if the cost of importing is cheaper than purchasing from the patentee. The period of 
emergency for which compulsory licences can be granted or parallel importation can be effected, includes 
any period when an emergency or disaster threatens the life or well being of a community or any period 
when Zimbabwe is engaged in any war.217 
5.3.1.2 Bollr Provision 
The early wor1<:ing of patents for rapid generic production to promote generic competition is provided for in 
the new section MA. This proposed provision would allow the experimental development of medicines that 
are under patent by any person. Test batches of the patented product can be produced six months before 
the patent expires but they cannot be put on the mar1<:et until the patent expires. However the bill does not 















5.4 Perceived Impact of the Agreement by Key Players 
Most people in the industry are not weH conversant with the TRIPs agreement; the ministry of health has 
failed to involve all the key players that should have been involved when implementing the agreement into 
the national legislation. The govemment went on to sign agreement without consulting with all the relevant 
key players in the industry. For example the govemment did not take into consideration that the local 
pharmaceutical industry is not as developed as that of industrialized countnes.219 
India has until 2005 to start implementing patents on formulation. this has given the country enough time to 
develop its industry and equip it with the necessary tools needed to implement the TRiPs agreement into 
their law system. In addition, they managed to create a market for themselves by not respecting patents on 
formulations, hence they were able to reverse engineer the process and work out another process, but in 
the end they ended up with the same raw material. Thus, they ended up with a market for their raw 
materials. After mastering the above, only did they manage to come up with their own chemical entities.220 
Therefore key players in the industry argue that the government should not have gone ahead to sign the 
agreement yet as yet. As a result the country has suffered a lot in terms of not having drugs that are 
cheaper and accessible. The country could have benefited a lot in terms of formulations if they had not gone 
ahead to sign the agreement straight away. They would be able to produce third generation generics for 
drugs still under patents like India and Egypt, which did not sign the agreement,221 However, this view is not 
consistent with the fact that Zimbabwe has always observed patents; therefore it is not clear how it \\'Quid 
have benefited in terms of formulations if it had not signed the agreement. Nevertheless, it is perceived that 
the local industry could benefit from making use of compulsory licensing, parallel importation and the Bolar 
provision.222 
The ethical drug association who are the importers are up in arm with regard to parallel importation. They 
perceive that parallel importation will negatively impact on their operations; this is because most 
multinationals have representing agents in Zimbabwe, and they pay for drug registration and retention fees 
and other expenses. They argue that it \\'OU1d be unfair then for someone who does not pay for all these 
costs to bring in these drugs from another source where they are cheaper.223 
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In tenns of foreign direct investment, it was fett that the country is not really going to see much because at 
the moment, foreign companies are not interested in investing in the country. In tenns of technological 
transfer, it was fett that there is likely to be transfer of the active ingredient and not necessarily technological 
transfer per ser. The response of multinational companies has been to continue to maintain control in 
industrialised countries and only primarily involved in opening local distribution centres responsible for 
distributing the medicines in developing countries.224 In addition, at the moment the political and economic 
situation in the country does not offer a favourable environment for any foreign direct investment. 
On the other hand most of the key players were very optimistic about the impact of the TRIPs provisions 
such as Bolar provision, compulsory licensing and Parallel importation. The government is going to 
effectively make use of these provisions, which are likely to increase access to vital medicines through 
reduction in prices and increase in availability in the country. 
5.5 Price Regulation in Zimbabwe 
There is no formaIIdirect price control in Zimbabwe. Price control introduction has proved to be quite a 
challenge in the country because the most of the raw materials and packing materials are imported and.aIso 
40% oHhe medicines consumed domestically are imported. Consequently. different manufacturers win have 
different manufacturing costs hence it is not so easy to have one price for a particular drug. It was·aIso 
pointed out there is lack of expertise within the regulatory authority to introduce price regulations. There has 
been a discussion underway however to put formal/direct price controls on the so-called essential medicines 
or medicines used for chronic conditions. Nonetheless, there are certain infonnaVindirect tools that are in 
place to try and regulate the prices of medicines. Still, their effect on prices of drugs is not as profound as 
with direct price regulation of putting floors or ceilings on prices. 
5.5.1 The Tendering System 
As noted earlier, public procurement is done through the tendering system. NatPhann puts to tender any 
drugs they wish to purchase. This means that number of finns will have to compete with each other to give 
the best quote to the govemment. Economic theory tells us that competition on its own prevents 
manufacturers from charging huge prices for their products. This enables NatPhann to get the best prices 
for their medicines. In addition they get discounts on their medicines because they purchase large volumes 













of medicines, which results in high demand. This enables them to negotiate favourable prices with suppliers 
because of high demand. On the other hand, since the government encourages generic procurement, drugs 
that are still under patent are less likely to be procured. Hence, their prices are less likely to be controlled 
through compet~ive tendering, for example, the government does not purchase antiretroviral drugs yet 
because there are no cheaper generics available for sale in ZimbabYIG. 
5.5.2 Essential Drug Policy and Generic Prescribing 
Generic drugs are as a rule preferred by Insurance programs and other third-party payers since they are 
cheaper than branded drugs. There are exceptions to this rule, ooYlever, for example when a large 
purchaser negotiates a favourable price for a brand name drug, it may turn out to be less expensive than the 
generic alternative. The essential drug policy encourages physicians and medical practitioners to prescribe 
generic drugs, which appear on the essential drug policy. This ensures that the majority of the population 
can have access to cheaper medication. In addition it is also cheaper for the government to purchase 
generics. It follows that this policy to some extent ensures that the poor can buy cheaper drugs. 
5.5.3 Drug Donation 
Donations of drugs that appear on the essential "5t imply that NatPharm only puts handling charges on 
drugs that are donated. Therefore, the prices that are paid by consumers at hospitals for drugs that have 
been donated will be below the market price for the drugs. HOYlGver, drug donations cannot be relied on 
since they are not frequent. There is no guarantee for Zimbabwe that donations will be maintained, and also 
the donor incurs costs, rather than being revenue neutral or making a profit. Therefore, donor companies 
may fail to sustain donations on a large scale, where several products are involved.225 Additionally most 
donor-funded projects have been suspended in the country because of the current political situation. 
Moreover, the guidelines for drug donations to the country have very strict specifications, which may prevent 
donations of certain drugs that do not appear on the essentiallist.22tI This implies that organisations that 
wish to donate drugs that are not generics or that are still under patent may find it diffICult to do so. It 
becomes complicated then for patented drug prices to be controlled through drug donations. In addition, 
drugs of a different dosage forms, strength and formulation from the ones commonly used in ZimbabYIG are 
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frequently not favoured. This is because the members of staff at different hospitals have been trained to use 
certain formulations and dosage forms and therefore cannot constantly change their treatment guidelines.227 
5.5.4 Import Duties and Mark-Ups 
The government has of late been trying han:! to bring down the amount charged for duties on all medicines. 
If a drug is considered essential or if it is used to treat chronic illnesses, then a zero percent Import duty is 
levied. Also the raw materials used in the production of such drugs have zero percent import duty. The 
government has also removed all import duties on all antiretroviral drugs. This has been done to try and 
curb the costs of these drugs to the final consumer. In addition, the Pharmacist society of Zimbabwe has 
agreed that all pharmacies that sell antiretroviral drugs should put a flat mark-up of 10%. However not all 
pharmacies are actually observing this rule. 
5.5.5 Drug Financing 
Financing of pharmaceuticals is fundamental because drugs save lives and improve health; hence drug 
financing should ensure access to essential drugs for all segments of the population. Drugs are also costly, 
in developing countries, they commonly represent from 25% to 50% of the total public and private health 
expenditures., Drug availability and effectiveness are key factors in maintaining public interest and 
contribution in health related activitieS.228 Common drug financing options used in the country include public 
financing, private and public health insurance, not-for-profit donations and out of pocket payments. An 
option that is 'likely to have profound effect on drug prices is public financing where an allocation is made 
from the health budget to purchase drugs. The funds are then used by NatPharm to purchase drugs that are 
much cheaper. Private and public health Insurance will have effect if insurance companies encourage their 
members to purchase generics, this would boost the demand for generics resulting in increase in demand 
and reduction in prices for generics. 
The above discussion has revealed that although formaVdirect price regulation is non-existent in Zimbabwe, 
there are certain tools that can be employed by the government to try and indirectly control prices there by 
curbing the costs of drugs. On the other hand it is evident that most of these tools used cannot really control 
the prices of those drugs that are patented and those that are not included on the essentiallisl Additionally, 
the pharmaceutical sector is exposed to external factors for example fluctuations in exchange rates. This is 
m Ministry of Health and child Welfare (1996) 













because about 90% of the raw materials and 40% of the drugs including all HIV drugs are imported. The 
industry is also more vulnerable to economic shocks because prices of most pharmaceuticals are 
intemationally determined because of importation, but in other hea~h care services prices are to a large 












6 ~HAPTER 6: RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIOij 
6.1 Introduction 
This section analyses the data and results and provides a discussion of the key findings. It mainly assesses 
the impact of supply side factors and demand side factors, which are patents, retail and wholesale mark· 
ups, duties, taxes and competitive tendering on prices. Two sensitivity analyses are also conducted to 
illustrate that the results are not insensitive to changes in exchange rates and the presence of parallel 
importation. Finally this section will briefly discuss the impact of final end user prices on access to affordable 
AIDS drugs in the country. 
6.2 Patents and Prices 
This subsection will look at the relationship between patents and prices. As noted earlier, evidence has 
shown that patents allow muRinationals to enjoy monopoly power since they do not face any competition, 
thereby charging higher prices and restricting output. This would resuR in higher prices than otherwise v.oold 
be if such prices were competitively determined in the presence of generic competition. It will be shown that 
generic drugs are cheaper than patented drugs because generic manufacturers do not bear all the costs of 
R&D. Thus, they are able to price their drugs equal to marginal cost and still able to make a profit. An 
important indicator of the price effect of market monopoly is the difference between the price of patented 
drugs in markets that respect strong patent laws, and the price of generic equivalents produced in countries 
where· there is no patent protection229• The presence of generic competition would eventually force the 
prices of patented drugs down since generic manufacturers are able to introduce their drugs at very low 
prices because of low production costs associated with the production of generics. Therefore, if the prices of 
patented drugs do not fall as a result of generic competition then the patent holders will not be able to seD as 
much since consumers can always switch to cheaper generics. Table 5 and 6 below computes the average 
prices of selected generic patented drugs. 













Table 5: Average prices for opportunistic infections generic drugs In Zimbabwe 
average price 
Pvt. lowest edlan 
$ 62.38 $ 28.91 $ 64.16 
$ 105.37 $ 80.93 $ 1n.40 1:2.19 $ 92.15 
$ 89.48 $ 111.73 $ 124.64 1:1.12 $115.13 
$ 89.48 $ 60.38 $ 102.73 1:1.70 $ 96.97 
$ 29.81 $ 28.05 $ 32.62 1:1.16 $ 29.09 
$ 309.85 $ 259.09 $ 388.15 1:1.50 $301.82 
$ 37.06 $ 21.93 $ 48.18 1:1.13 $ 39.15 
$ 350.98 $ 313.64 $ 376.82 1:1.20 $363.40 
$ 9.15 $ 10.95 $ 14.09 1:1.29 $ 11.85 
$ 118.64 $ 64.09 $ 145.60 1:1.73 $120.00 
$ 80.48 $ 23.64 $ 134.18 1:5.68 $ 19.31 
$ 123.09 $ 104.18 $ 167.25 1:1.61 $101.82 
$ 121.82 $ 134.55 1:1.23 $121.82 
1:1.42 $ 33.59 
Table 6:.Average prices for opportunistic infections patented drugs In ZImbabwe 
portl.lnlllltk: Infections Drugs average price 
Pvt. lowest 
$ 130.47 $ 108.21 
$ 350.98 $ 313.64 1:1.20 
$ 159.88 $ 116.35 1:2.39 
1:1.09 
Tables a and b, (see appendix) giVe the average retail prices in US dollars of different units of 35 dosage 
forms of 35 most commonly used drugs in the treatment of HIVIAIDS and related illnesses. The tables also 
give the highest and lowest prices for nine pharmacies in the private sector and the ratio between lowest 
and highest price for each drug. Tables 3 and 4 above shows a few selected drugs from Table a in the 
appendix. Table 1 shows the data for generic drugs and Table 2 shows the drugs that are still under patent 
that are used to treat opportunistic infections. It is clear from table b in the appendix that there is no 
systematic pattern indicating that the average prices are way above the median, thus it is least likely that 
there are extreme values that are pushing the averages up. 
A closer look at the results above reveals that pharmacies sell their drugs at different prices in Zimbabwe. 













varies from 1:1,09 to 1:1,29. The retail prices of both generics and patented drugs do not vary wideIy230, 
however, the retail prices of generics show a much wider difference in the range of retail prices relative to 
the retail prices of the patented drugs. This is because patented drugs face no generic competition. These 
results indicate that, in Zimbabwe, the patented drugs enjoy monopoly231 and there is very little price 
difference among pharmacies. 
Generic drugs are not under patent therefore they compete among themselves and also compete with the 
Originators' branded drugs. However, if we take the 'rule of five" into consideration,232 it is clear this rule 
does not hold in Zimbabwe. This is because most of these generic drugs do not really face that much 
competition because there are less than fIVe therapeutic altematives233 for each opportunistic infection.234 
This could be the reason why the range in retail prices among generic drugs does not vary as widely.235 
Zimbabwe like other developing countries has not put into the market some of the cheaper generic 
equivalents available in the world market. Although generics are not patented, to some extent, a monopoly 
market for these drugs exists. There are actors in the pharmaceutical industry that are making monopoly 
profits from generic drugs as result of limited competition among generics. 
Table 7:.Average prices for HIVIAIDS patented drugs in Zimbabwe 
lowest 
$ 918.18 
$247.93 $ 694.78 $ 435.73 
$1,110.90 $ 752.73 $1,655.11 $ 972.40 
$1,106.60 $ 721.51 $1,757.13 $1490.76 
$ 190.86 $149.84 $ 256.93 $ 210.25 
$ 81.89 $ 63.82 $ 95.02 
$ 507.58 $424.51 $ 827.15 
$ 394.62 $335.45 $ 517.18 
230 This is relative to other findings from other studies undertaken, for example, by Bala and Sagoo. They found that in 
OECD the range of ratios for generic drugs varied from 1:2 to 1 :11. 5 and in developing countries that do not observe 
patents. the range for patented products varied from 1 :1.2 to 1 :4. BaJa and Sagoo (2000) 
231 Zimbabwe has always observed process and product patents 
232This argument Is based on the idea that prices tend towards their lowest achievable when there are five or more 
competing products. This is because long-term experience with pharmaceutical pricing has showed that lowest prices 
are generally achieved only when there are five therapeutic alternatives or five competing producers. WHO-WTO 
secretariat (2001) and Ministry of Health and child Welfare 
233 See table 8 and the discussion that follows 












Table 7 shows the average prices of antiretroviral drugs and the ratios between the lowest and highest price 
for each drug. The above results support earlier findings that patented drugs enjoy monopoly po1N8r in 
Zimbabwe hence the retail price range only varies from 1:1,22 to 1:2,8, which is relatively not a huge 
variation compared to the one found in the study done by Bala, and Sagoo.236 Results from patented 
antiretroviral drugs marketed in Zimbab\YEI also support the above findings that there is little variation in 
prices among pharmacies because of absence of generic competition. 
6.2.1 Price Comparison of Patented VS Generic Drugs 
This subsection will look at the price difference between patented drugs and generics within the same 
therapeutic class. 
Table 8: Patented 'IS. generic drug prices of equivalent therapeutic classes In Zimbabwe 
Table 8 above shows a comparison of retail prices in US dollars of 100 units of 12 drugs of equivalent units 
(5 patented drugs, 6 generics and 1 off-patent drug) that are used to treat opportunistic infections. This 
comparison is done for drugs, which are within the same therapeutic class for which comparable data are 
available. For example, Fluconazole is an antifangal drug used to treat: 
• Prophylaxis or Cryptococcal Meningitis 
• Oropharyngeal and Vaginal candidiasis (not responding topical therapy) 
• Oesophageal and systematic Candidiasis 
• Treatment and maintenance of Coccidiodomycosis. 












It falls in the same therapeutic class as Ketoconazole since Ketoconazole is used to treat oesophageat and 
resistant Oropharyngeal Candidiasis.231 It is evident that Fluconazole, which is still under patent is 28 times 
more expensive than Ketoconazole. 
Azithromycin and Metronidazole are used to treat mycobacterium Avium infections and Chalamydium 
infections for example genital Chalamydia and Gonorrhoea infections and KJacid is used to treat 
Mycobacterium Avium complex infections in AIDS patients. From the table it clear that Metronidazole is 595 
times less expensive then Azithromycin and 146 times less expensive than Klacid. 
Doxorubicin is used to treat Kaposi Sarcoma and AIDS related lymphoma. Amoxycillin and Cotrimoxazole 
are used to treat HIV related respiratory conditions of which pulmonary Kaposi Sarcoma is one of them. this 
puts these three in the same therapeutic class as Doxorubicin. Doxorubicin is 54 times more expensive than 
Amoxycillin and 269 times more expensive than Cotrimoxazole. Amphotericin B (vial) is an old drug that is 
not patented anymore but it faces little generic competition because It is diffICult to manufacture. It is used in 
HIVIAIDS to treat Cryptoooccal Meningitis, Histoplasmosis and Coccidiodomycosis, Aspergillosis. 238 
Itraconazole is used to treat resistant oral and Oesophageal Candidiasis, m8intenance of Cryptococoosis, 
and in the treatment of Histoplasmosis. Given what Fluconazole is used to treat, it follows Fuconazole and 
Amphotericin B fall in the same therapeutic class and Itraconazole and Amphotericin B are in the same 
class. However, since Amphotericin B is off patent and faces some competition, it 17 times cheaper than 
Itraconazole and 21 times cheaper than Fluconazole 
The above results support the notion that, patented drugs are more expensive than generic drugs. On the 
other hand drugs that are not patented anymore tend to be less expensive than those, which are sliD under 
patent even if they face little competition. This further evidence to support the idea that patents (where they 
are observed) lead to higher prices because of the monopoly power they enjoy.239 
Figure 6 below compares the prices of six patented HIV drugs that are sold in Zimbabwe to prices of six 
generic equivalents (in US dollars, of equivalent units) that are sold in India for which comparable data is 
available. The drug prices are for a month's supply. The graph illustrates, that there is a stark contrast 
between the prices of patented products in Zimbabwe and the price of the non-patented equivalents in India. 
It is evident that the prices in Zimbabwe for patented drugs are way above the prices of their generic 
equivalents produced in India. 
237 EDLIZ (2000) and UNICEF, UNAIDS Secretariat (2001) 
238 UNICEFand UNAIDS Secretariat (2001) 
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However, the above results need to be interpreted with caution because of the data problems encountered 
during data collection. Firstly because of a small sample size, they were fewer data points used to compute 
average pricesl. Hence the above results may not be representative of the whole population. In addition in 
some cases pack sizes and strength for some drugs were different across pharmacies. Hence some prices 
were imputed based on the per unit pack which ooukllead to biased price comparisons. 
Nonetheless, the above results support and coofirm conclusions reached in studies by Baia and Sagoo 
(2000) and Myhr (2000) that patented drugs tend to be more expensive than their generic equivalents. This 
is so because their manufacturers do not face any competition, hence they act as monopolies. This enables 
them to set higher prices and at the same time restrict output. The prices of generics in India show that 
product competition through availability of generics will result in lower prices, since generics are priced at 
lower prices than their patented counterparts. India has not started observing patent laws yet, therefore they 
benefit from generic competition through generic manufacturing using reverse engineering. On the other 
hand it is important to understand the economics of patents. Patents are there to reward research based 
companies for undertaking R&D. Complete removal of patents coukl result in under investment in R&D and 
} 
innovation, thus resulting in the reduction in number of nelNer drugs introduced onto the market. This calls 
for a balance to be struck between the need to promote R&D ar)(! the need to promote competition that 
results in competitive prices for drugs. Additionally, it is important to note th,at prices in Zimbabwe are not 
country specific; these are most likely intemational prices set in the international drug market. Yet, these are 
the prices consumers in Zimbabwe are faced with. 
lt is argued that, India and Brazil are two of the few developing countries with pharmaceutical industries 
capable of producing generics through reverse engineering. However, evidence from interviews carried out 
in Zimbabwe with marketing managers of manufacturing companies showed that the expertise and 
technological know-how to produce generics is available. This further supports the idea that if local 
manufacturers in Zimbabwe were allowed to produce generics, then the prices of antiretroviral drugs would 
faU substantially. Studies done in India and Brazil have shown that the prices of generics are between 50%-
70% less than brand name drugs. Between 1996 and 2000, Brazil substantially increased its large-scale 
production of antiretroviral drugs. By 2000, there were 11 local producers. During this period, the average 
price fell by up to 73% fur domestically produced drugs and prices had come down by 82% within five years. 
240 In the same country, recent offers from generic producers have sparked a price war for antiretroviral 
drugs and this has caused the price of a year's triple therapy to fall from $10,000 to $350 in a single year. 












Drug patenting in Zimbabwe has substantial impact on prices as evidenced above, consequently it impacts 
on afford ability. Not only are prices too high for average individuals, but also such high prices put huge 
strain on the country's financial resources since these drugs have to be purchased in US dollars. Such 
exorbitant prices makes it impossible for the government to finance such highly priced drugs and make them 
available in public hospitals. This is because they consume a substantial amount of the health budget. This 
is one of the reasons why antiretroviral drugs and some important drugs that are used to treat opportunistic 
infections are unavailable In the public sector. However, although low availability of drugs in not unexpected 
in the public sector, total absence of AIDS drugs and related illnesses should be unacceptable because 
poor people rely on the public sector to get their drugs since this Is where some of their drug costs are at 
least covered.241 
In short, it is clear that monopoly markets are bound to thrive In the absence of competition. The absence of 
competition WIll allow multinational companies to keep up high prices for as long as the patent is stiU valid. 
Monopoly prices can be reduced through competition, and this will make drugs cheaper especially in 
developing countries. Introduction of generics in Zimbabwean will force multinationals to decrease their 
prices in order to compete with local manufacturers. On the other hand, IPR protection is necessary to 
encourage R&D and innovations. However, since Africa only constitutes 1.3% of the total global sales. 
Hence. the introduction of generics in these countries would surely not significantly harm the profits of 
multinationals as long as there is a mechanism in place to prevent spillovers into industrialized countries In 
disease cases such as HIVIAIDS where there are global markets. Another argument against the introduction 
of generics is that, if generics were allowed in developing countries, then multinationals would not invest in 
R&D for medicines needed to treat tropical diseases such as Malaria.242 However, com~ research-
based companies through payments of royalties and issuing compulsory licenses could go some WWf in 
resolving this issue. Therefore, there is need to strike a balance between the need to encourage R&D USing 
IPR and efforts by governments of developing countries to minimise the negative impact of patents 00 
prices of essential medicines. It will be in the best interest of public health to have low priced antiretroviral 
drugs in Zimbabwe because price is a critical factor when choosing drugs for the essential drug list. One of 
the main reasons why there are no antiretroviral drugs on the essential drug list is because of their 
exceptionally high prices.243 
241 Myhr (2000) 
242 Bata and Sagoo (2000) 












6.3 Duties, Mark-ups and Taxes 
This sub-section seeks to assess the contribution of import duties, mark-ups and taxes to the final retail 
price of pharmaceuticals used in the treatment of HIVIAIDS and related illnesses. Import duties, mark-ups 
and taxes are likely to contribute substantially to the costs of drugs especially in a country like Zimbabwe 
where there is no formaVdirect price control on drugs. Distribution margins including retail mark-ups are 
important since they frequently account for as much as half of the consumer price244, margin structures also 
provides dispensing incentives.245 Import duties increase the prices of imported drugs directly by levying a 
tax on them. In addition the resulting costs of Importing drugs also allows domestic producers to charge 
higher prices for their outputs than if there were no import tariffs.246 
The retail mark-ups for patented antiretrovlral drugs varied between 10% and 25% and the retaR mark-ups 
for opportunistic infections medicines varied between 40% and 50%. Because of these disparities in mark-
ups used by different pharmacies and wholesalers, average mark-ups were used. Unlike other African 
countries, for example Kenya and Uganda, Zimbabwe charges import duties on an drugs for acute iDnesses. 
However, there are no import duties for all medicines used to treat chronic illness and for HIV drugs. Table 9 
below shows the percentage contribution of all taxes, duties and mark-ups to the final price from the 
manufacturer up to the retail pharmacies. 
Table 9 OffICial duties, taxes, mark-ups etc 
As shown in table 9 above, there are no import duties charged on all antiretroviral drugs, on the other hand. 
since most drugs for opportunistic infections are used to treat acute illness, they attract 10% duty on cost if 
the drugs are imported. Therefore, when wholesalers put their mark-up, they fot add the amount of the duty 
levied to the costs price and then mark-up their opportunistic infections drugs by about 30%. However, the 
244 According to WHO, import duties, taxes, wholesale and retail mark-ups, both formal and informal, can double the 
price of a drug between the manufacturer and the consumer. 
245 WHO (1998) 
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6.4 Competitive Tendering arK! Bulk Purchasing 
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Miconazole varginal cream cost approximately $ 0.13 in the public sector and about $22.26 in the private 
sector, which makes it $22.13 times less expensive in the public sector than in the private sector. 
The above results reveal the importance of competitive tendering in the public sector in Zimbabwe. 
NatPharm receives discounts through bulk purchasing, which reduces its cost prices substantially. In 
addition competitive tendering ensures that NatPharm gets the best competitive price for all drugs it puts to 
tender. Moreover the public sector also receives some drug donations from several international 
organisations; hence, they only have to put a handling charge on these drugs lNtIen seiling them. AU this 
contributes to the lower prices charged in the public sector compared to the private sector. These findings 
suggest that that if Zimbabwe were allowed to issue compulsory licenses or make use of parallel 
importation, antiretroviral drugs could be obtained at much cheaper price than in the private sector. This 
would be as a result of the tendering system, lNtIich ensures that the public sector is able to receive the 
lowest prices possible. As noted earlier the poor depend so much on the public sector, for this reason, if 
drugs could be obtained cheaply, less strain would be put on the public sector's financial resources. 
Antiretroviral drugs would be made available in the public sector since the government would be able to 
purchase them cheaply through the tendering system from both local and foreign manufacturers for 
example, Cipla in India. Cheaper drugs for the poor ~uld imply increase in access, and as a result, there 
will be an improvement in the health status of the vast majority of the population suffering from AIDS. 
On the other hand, as noted earlier, one should also be aware of government failure. The government is not 
immune to failures. Therefore there is need to evaluate potential failures associated with government public 
sector provisions and rectify these were possible before putting all the responsibility in the hands of the 
government. Sometimes a near Pareto optimum outcome could be achieved by combining both public 
sector and private sector provision. 
6.5 Comparing Prices of Antiretroviral Drugs In Zimbabwe With International Prices 
The objective of this section is to compare the prices of antiretroviral drugs in Zimbabwe with international 
prices. The aim is to compare how prices in Zimbabwe fare compared to other countries. This section win 
show that although tile prices of identical drugs varies between the countries under comparison, there is no 
clear correlation between the per capita gross national income and prices of drugs charged in Zimbabwe. It 
will also be shown that anti-HIV drugs prices are on average higher in Zimbabwe than in the United States. 












because the prices are too high. Such high prices are mainly as a result of the presence of patents, lack of 
generic competition, the black market exchange rates, high mark-ups and taxesltariffs. 
Table 11: Cross-country compariloo of HIV Drug pricn 
ndla 
$ 450.00 
1.041.08 $ 13.07 
1.110.90 $ 30.50 
190.86 $ 21.79 109.20 
81.89 $ 5.45 291.00 18.00 
2.162.81 583.20 367.20 
ramune 60 $ 394.62 $ 21.79 $ 255.00 $ 78.00 $ 282.00 :18 
Source; Drug prices survey in Zimbabwe, P~rez-Casas (2000). HIVIAIDS Medicines Pricing Reporl Setting and 
http://www.cipladoc.comIpublicationsiaidswatchlaidsupdate.htm#newprices 
Table 11 presents the results for each country and for each drug. It summaries the average prices of seven 
anti-retroviral drugs of the given strength and quantity for which comparable data is available in five different 
countries together with their respective per capita gross national income. One would expect the prices of 
drugs to be higher in the USA than any other country since ~ is a high income industrialised countries and 
the rest are middle income and low-income countries. However the table above shows that all drugs except 
Zerit are more expensive in Zimbabwe than in the USA and all the other three countries under comparison. 
USA has gross national income of $34100. which is about 74 times higher than that of ZimbabYJe. The ratio 
of price differences betYJeen Zimbabwe and USA ranges between 1:1,5 to 1:5,5. Which implies that HIV 
drugs in Zimbabwe are betYJeen 55% and 403% more expensive than those in the USA. The price 
difference in drugs betYJeen Zimbabwe and Uganda could be as result that Uganda has been receiving 
generic versions from countries like India and Brazil after it declared a state of emergency for AIDS. BrazH 
has lower drug prices as a result of the availability of generic versions. Locally produced HIV drugs in Brazil 
are sold at a fraction of their global prk:es.257 A generic form of Zidovudine is about 50 times cheaper in 
Brazil than in Zimbabwe. The cheapest drug in Brazil (3tc) is about 5684% more expensive in Zimbabwe 
than in Brazil. 
There is now adequate clinical data to provide evidence -that combination therapy with 2 or 3 drugs is far 
superior to mono therapy and that triple therapy can contain viral reproduction by up to 2 years. None of the 












approved antiretroviral agents can eradicate the infection, but if given in combination they can suppress viral 
replication, improve immunologic status, delay infectious complications and prolong life.258 
Table 12: Price comparisons of Combination Therapies In fIVe countries 
ndla nda 
$ 371 $ 2.701 
$11,023.96 $ 1,992.90 $ 219.00 
$12,666.46 $ 3,160.90 $ 219.00 
$ 26,314.20 $ 7,095.60 $4,467.60 
$ 50 004.62 $12 49.40 $4 905.60 
$ 4,644.27 $530.26 $ 2.657.20 $ 730.00 $ 1,898.00 
$ 996.31 $ 66.28 $ 3,540.50 $ 219.00 $ 2.263.00 
$ 4,801.19 $265.13 $ 3,102.50 $ 949.00 $ 3431.00 
etal 20 $10,441.77 $861.67 $ 9,300.20 $1,898.00 $ 7,592.00 
Source: drug price SlJIWY in Zimbabwe, Perez·Casas (2000), HIVIAIDS Medicines Pricing Report and 
http://www.cipladoc.comIpublicatiooslaidswatchlaidsupdate.htmlnewprlces 
Table 12 above shows one example of a dual therapy (Combivir) and two examples of triple therapies and 
their average prices for a year's supply in five countries for which comparable data is available. AD the 
combination therapies are more expensive in Zimbabwe than in the other four countries under comparison. 
In' Brazil and India, where Combivir is produced locally as a generic, the total yeariy cost of a dual therapy 
oombi'nation is US $371 in India and US $511 in Brazil. In Zimbabwe where no generics are available, the 
total cost is about US$13,515 per year, which is 35 times more expensive in Zimbabwe than in India, and 25 
times less expensive in Brazil. The second triple therapy is 12 times more expensive in Zimbabwe than in 
India where generics are available, and 1.12 times less expensive In the USA than in Zimbabwe and 1.4 
times cheaper in Uganda (where proprietary brands are sold) than in Zimbabwe. 
The above analysis reveals that, of all the drugs surveyed, the retail prices259 are higher in Zimbabwe than 
in USA, Brazil, India and Uganda, of which Brazil and USA are much more developed and more affluent 
than Zimbabwe. Brazil has a GNI per capita of US $3 580, which is about 8 times more than that of 
Zimbabwe. This supports evidence from other studies, which shows that variation in prices between 
industrialized countries and developing countries are especially marked, yet not in the pattern of lower 
prices for lower-income countries that maybe expected.260 This is also supported by findings from a study 
258 Aids watch (2000) 
259 Expect for Zerit which is more expensive in the USA 












done in ten African countries that clearly showed that pricing policies of multinational companies were the 
major variable. This study went on to show that it is wrong to assume that these firms automatically chmge 
lower prices in developing countries. Rather prices are often higher in developing countries because of the 
strategy of targeting sales at local elites - a low volume, high price market. In addition, developed countries 
with national health systems are better able to negotiate reduced prices with research-based firms 
compared to developing countries.261 Also, it has been shown that lamivudine is marketed by Glaxo in 
developed countries at prices 20 per cent lower on average than in Africa. Prices for branded versions of 
lamivudine are higher in Mozambique, "where over half of the population lives below the poverty line and 
14% of the population has the HIV virus·, than in the USA.262 
Zimbabwe is among one of the poorest countries in the world and it has recently been going through a 
recession. However. its average drug prices are higher than one of the richest nations in the world, USA. 
The above results do not support what one would expect. higher prices in USA and Brazil than in 
ZimbabINe. Moreover, in the case of the USA and other high-income countries, the costs of heatth services 
and medication are meet by prepaid private insurance or public health insurance. In Zimbabwe most people 
meet their treatment costs including the medicine expenses through out of pocket payments. In sub-
Saharan Africa, about two-thirds of the total spending on drugs is made by households. This is a reflection 
of the inadequacy of public health investment and the inability of poor people to afford private health 
insurance.263 
6.6 Implications of High End User Drug Prices on Access to· Affordable Antiretrovirll 
Drugs 
Drug afford ability is among other things a function of householdlindividual inco~ and/or share of the 
health budget devoted to purchasing medicines and the cost of medicines. About 50-90% of pharmaceutical 
expenses are met through out of pocket purchases and medicine expenses account for a large portion of 
out of pocket health expenses at individual or household Ievel.265 Richer households are far less sensitive 
than poorer households to price changes because the same expense will represent iii larger share of poorer 
households' income. Moreover, for poorer households, spending their income on medicines may divert 
resources from other necessities, such as food and education. As a result. the main focus should be on 
261 Oxfam (2001) 
262 Oxfam (2001) pp. 28 
263 Oxfam (2001) 
264 In this case average wages are use as a proxy for householdlindividual income 












minimising drug prices to ensure affordability. There is no clear correlation between prices of medicines and 
per capita gross national income or purchasing power parities in developing countries. On the other hand, in 
developed countries, high insurance coverage, which includes some parts of cost of drugs, helps ensure 
affordability.266 
Findings from the results analysis section have has shown that patents, generic competition, competitive 
tenderinglbulk purchasing import duties, taxes and mark-ups could profound impact on prices of medicines 
in Zimbabwe. Economic theory tells us that increase in price for a commodity would mean a reduction in 
demand and quantity demanded because consumers wiH be unable to afford the commodity at such a high 
prices. It follows that high drug prices can prevent access to drugs. In addition such high drug prices could 
aiso imply that the govemment of Zimbabwe cannot put such drugs on the essential list although the drugs 
may be essential. The govemment could aiso be prevented from financing such drugs because they would 
consume a large portion of the health budget. 
The results in table 12 above reveal that, for CombMr, it \Wuld cost the government of Zimbabwe about 14 
million US dollars and about 10,5 million US dollars for the cheapest triple therapy of the t\W to treat a 
thousand people every year if it were provided. The cheapest triple therapy (to treat a thousand patience) 
would consume 2.6% of the health budget, which is US $400 minion for 2002. It is estimated that 96 
thousand people are dying every year of the disease and about 1,5 minion people are infected in 
Zimbabwe.2li7 However, not all the infected individuals need treatment since some of them die. From these 
statistics, it can be estimated that about 6.4% of those infected die every year, therefore, about 94.6% 
(1,404 000 million) of those infected need treatment every year. This means that it \WUId cost the 
govemment about US $15 billion to provide the cheapest triple therapy treatment for these people. This 
amount surpasses the current annual health budget by far. 
Essentially, it costs the Brazilian public health system the same amount to treat 1,000 HIVIAIDS patients per 
year, as it \Wuld the Zimbabwean government to treat approximately 182 HIVIAIDS patients per year if the 
govemment tried to provide antiretrovlral drugs. It would costs the India government the same amount to 
treat 1000 HIV patients per year as it would the Zimbabwean government to treat only 83 patients per 
year.266 
266 Ibid 
267 Associated Press (2002) 












The agricultural sector in Zimbab'lle is characterised by low skilled workers who earn an average income of 
about US $55 a month, and the majority of the people in the country live in the rural areas and rely on the 
agriculture sector for survival. They do not really have formal employment; hence their income is dependent 
on how well crops do in that particular year. The average income in the manufacturing industry is about US 
$181 a month.269It follows that the yearly average income for a farm worker is about US $660 and that of a 
manufacturing worker is about US $2172. It is clear that this amount is barely enough to buy a cocktail of a 
year's triple therapy, which costs about US $10,442. Farm workers would need to work an equivalent of 
about 15,8 years if they \¥ere to purchase a year's triple therapy and manufacturing workers would need to 
work an equivalent of about 4,8 years if there were to purchase a years triple therapy. This assumes that 
they save aR their income without purchasing other necessities like food, rent and electricity and payment of 
other bilis. HO'llever, evidence from developed countries for example Canada, shows that a year's triple 
therapy treatment for HIV infections costs an equivalent of four to six month's salary and a greater part of 
the costs of drugs is reimbursed.27o 
In summary the above, results and findings have shown that HIV drugs are more expensive in ZiI'11bab\Ne 
than in the other four countries under comparison. The costs of HIV drugs are definitely out of the reach of 
the Zimbab'llean health system, with a year's triple therapy costs of treating those who require treatment far 
exceeding the annual health budget for the country. Average workers in Zimbabwe can only dream of ever 
affording to buy mono-therapies of antiretroviral drugs, let alone combination therapies. Prices are 
exceptionally high in Zimbabwe and this is negatively impacting on affordability of AIDS drugs. Some of.the 
price differences could be attributed to parallel market exchange rates in Zimbabwe. Yet, it is stiR clear in the 
sensitivity analysis in section 6.7 below, that prices in India are still way below those in Zimbabwe. 
Additionally, price comparisons between developing countries with different patent regimes show akin 
results. A study done by Lanjouw shows that prices in Pakistan, which respects product patents for 
pharmaceuticais, are 3 to 14 times higher than in India, which will not grant patents until 2005. While 
Pakistan is comparatively richer than India, the income difference is too small to account for the price 
differentials. 271 
On the other hand, the Brazilian and India government were able to provide antiretroviral drugs to more than 
80,000 citizens by the end of 1999, which led to a more than 50% drop in AIDS-related mortality between 
1996 and 1999. This is as a result of the availability of cheaper generic drugs.272 In 1997, there were 
269 Income and expenditure surveys (2001) 
270 Myhr (2000) 
271lanjouw (1999) and Oxfam (2001) 












580,000 people living with HiViAIDS in Brazil.273 Nonetheless, if Brazil provided patented treatments to 
HIVIAIDS sufferers, the costs would consume the entire nation's drug budget. Notwithstanding US pressure, 
Brazil continues to manufacture generic equivalents at one-fifth of the costs of the US products, and it is 
making them widely available. This has reduced mortality rates by SOOk since 1996,274 The availability of 
cheaper generic versions has enabled the Government of Brazil to save at least US $472 million on 
hospitalisations and treatment for opportunistic infections betvleen 1997 and 1999.275 
Consequently, besides the high social costs of not providing antiretroviral drugs, there are real financial 
costs for the government when antiretrovirai drugs are not available at affordable levels. It could be more 
costly for a government not to provide amiretroviral drugs than to provide them, because of the high costs 
involved in caring for AIDS patients.276If people in Zimbabwe continue to be denied access to antiretroviral 
drugs because of such high prohibiting drug prices, which makes antiretroviral drugs unaffordable to the 
majority of the population in Zimbabwe, then HIVIAIDS will continue to condemn AIDS infected individuals to 
premature deaths. 
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis Assuming a Different Exchange Rate 
A sensitivity analysis assuming a different exchange rate is fraught with the following problem, it is difficult to 
track whether the wholesalers actually bought drugs using foreign currency obtained at black market rates 
or whether they were able to source foreign currency somehow at the official rates. If some of the drugs 
were purchased with foreign currency obtained at the official rate then the calculations used would 
underestimate the priceS given in column five. 
273 Human development report (2000) 
274 UNAIDS (2oo2a) 
275 Brazilian Department of Health (Unpublished data) 












Table 13: Cost of Combination therapies (exchange rate sensitivity analysis) 
mbabwe 
Offk:al rate nella 
$ 2,471.92 $ 311.13 $5,153.80 
$ 851.45 $ 530.26 $2,657.20 
$ 182.66 $ 66.28 $3,540.50 
$ 880.22 $ 265.13 $3,102.50 
Table 13 above shows the estimated average retail prices of a dual therapy and triple therapy combinations 
for Zimbabwe assuming both the black market exchange rate (which most of the imported drugs in the 
private sector are bought at by wholesalers} and the official exchange rate, 'In and the prices for India and 
USA for which comparable data is available. The results reveal that, if one assumes an official exchange 
rate, the price of a dual therapy and triple therapy is about 5.45 times less compared to the black market 
rate price which most of the imported antiretroviral drugs are purchased at by wholesalers. It is also evident 
that. at the official rate the prices in Zimbabwe 'NOukt be about 4.9 times less than those in the USA and 
only about 2.4 times higher than those in India. This shows that consumers could save qu~e substantial 
amount if the official exchange rate were to prevail in the country. 
Although the above results are not 100% reliable the black market rate in Zimbabwe has a huge impact on 
the current prevailing drug prices in Zimbabwe. The black market exchange rate implies that imported drugs 
become more expensive than otherwise if an offICial exchange rate prevailed. This is later translated into 
higher domestic prices, in other 'NOrds imported inflation is the end result. However. as noted earlier these 
results should be interpreted with caution taking into account that it is difficult to tell whether the final prices 
reflect the effect of the black market exchange rate or not. There is need for further investigation with regard 
to exchange rates, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The local industry's key players argue that multinationafs should try and assess those local firms who have 
the capacity to produce antiretroviral drugs and give them voluntary licenses without having to be 
approached first. This 'NOukt greatly reduce the costs of antiretroviral drugs because of local generic 
manufacturing. Wholesalers require 100% foreign currency to import fully finished products. However, if 
there is local production they will be some local component. It follows that the availability of such drugs 












would improve if compulsory licences vvere issued because the governmentlwholesalers would not require 
100% foreign currency to purchase locally produced generics. Foreign currency would only be needed to 
import raw materials rather than the whole finished product of which foreign costs would be built in. Certain 
production costs (e.g. labour costs} in developed countries are much more expensive than domestic 
equivalents. The Zimbabvvean government has agreed to make available foreign at official market rates to 
manufacturers who win tender bids in order to buy raw materials for drugs that would be sold in the public 
sector. However when producing for the private sector or buying for the private sector wholesalers and 
manufacturers have to go out and source for foreign currency at black market rates. The production of 
cheaper generics would act as an incentive for the government to fmance antiretroYiral drugs and include 
them on the essential list. Accordingly, foreign currency would be made available to local manufacturers to 
buy the raw materials at official rates. This would further reduce the prices of drugs by a substantial 
amount,278 
6.8 Sensitivity Analysis Assuming Parallel Importation (Public And Private Sedor) 
Parallel importation is based on the principle of exhaustion of rights; it allows cross border trade in a 
patented product or its generics without the manufacturer's permission. This is only possible when parallel 
importation has been implemented into a country's national law. Parallel imports allow countries to import 
brand name products or their generic equivalents from countries where the patent holder or licensee sells 
them at a Iovver price,279 Parallel importation is not yet allovved since the bill has not yet become law. 
Therefore the Impact of parallel importation can only be estimated by means of a sensitivity analysis, 
assuming that parallel Importation was allovved from India. It is important to note that these results are only 
estimates and caution should be taken when interpreting them. 
Table 14 below shows the prices of two combination therapies in Zimbabvve, India and USA. There are 
three different prices shown for Zimbabvve. The first price column shows the final average price in the public 
sector assuming parallel importation from India using the official rate. An official exchange rate is used here 
because Natpharm gets its foreign currency at the offICial rate from the government when they import drugs. 
The second column shows the price in the public sector assuming a black market exchange rate since 
private wholesalers have to source for their own foreign currency at unoffICial rates. The third price column 
shows the prevailing average prices in the private sector. In addition, the final prices assuming parallel 
importation vvere estimated as follows: 
278 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (2002) 












Firstly the prices of antiretroviral drugs offered in the public sector in India Mfe taken as given in the table. 
Secondly, all the taxes, and mark-ups at wholesale and retail level plus the dispensing fees as per table 9 
above Mre added on to the prices. Import duties Mre not added since all antiretroviral drugs are exempted 
from import duties. 
Table 14: Sensitivity analysillUumlng parallellmportltlon In Zimbabwe 
845.91 $ 4.615.88 
105.74 $ 578.58 
422.96 $ 
It is evident from the table above that Combivir would be 23 times cheaper in the public sector and about 4 
times less expensive in the private sector than the current prevaHing price. The triple therapy combination is 
estimated to be 659% less expensive in the private sector and 39% cheaper in the private sector compared 
to the current prevailing price of $10 442. A cross-country comparison shows that, with a parallel 
Importation, ZimbabM could actually achieve prices that are about 6.8 times IoYIer in the public:: sector and 
28% lower in the private sector than those offered in the USA. With parallel importation the prices in the 
public sector for triple therapy are only 1.5 times higher in the public sector and 8.7 times more in private 
sector than in India. HOMver, there are 12 times more expensive in the private sector without parallel 
importation. 
These results reveal that consumers could buy drugs that are approximately 10.5 times less expensive in 
the public sector and 3.3 times less expensive in the private sector than the current prevaiting prices in the 
private sector. Parallel importation from India could reduce the costs of drugs from $10,442 to $1,375 per 
patient per year if these drugs were made available in public sector and to about $7, 500 per patient per 
year in the private sector. On the other hand, even with parallel a farm worker will still have to work an 
equivalent of about 2 years in order to afford the triple therapy in the public sector and a manufacturing 













These findings show that parallel importation will go a long way in reducing the costs of drugs in both the 
public and the private sector. However, even with parallel importation, the prices will still not be low enough 
for average workers in the country. Nonetheless parallel importation will at least give incentive to the 
government to include these drugs on the essential list. This in its self would make a difference since 
government stores would be able to procure these drugs through competitive tendering. The government 
can offer tender bids to countries like Thailand, India and Brazil that are currently producing these generic 
drugs. These manufacturers would have to actively compete for the bids, which could result in further 
reduction in prices. Moreover, the government would get substantial discount as a result of bulk 
procurement. 
Even so, the implication of the above for the government is that, there is need for substantial, sustainable 
and adequate financing for medicines. This would enable the government to subsidise drugs procured 
through parallel importation to average consumers since they will stiR not be able to afford them if there is no 
financing mechanism in place to help subsidise the drugs. There is need to review the health budget and 
reallocate financial resources. The government should then seek to obtain voluntary licences so that local or 
foreign generic producers can supply life saving drugs as this would help bring prices down. In instances 
where voluntary licenses cannot be obtained then compuisory licenses could be issued. Furthermore 
international organisations should actively support the country's efforts to improve access to affordable He 
saving drugS.280 












~ Chapter seven: Conclusion and Recommendationij 
7.1 Introduction 
This study aimed at establishing the impact of key supply side and demand side factors on final end user 
prices of drugs that are used to treat AIDSIHIV and related opportunistic infections. Further more the study 
aimed at establishing the implications of the final consumer prices of antiretroviral drugs on access to 
affordable life saving medicines for the majority of the population in Zimbabwe. This section will give a 
summary and overview of the key research findings. The key findings are presented in relation to the 
objectives outlined in chapter one. The most important policy recommendations that arise are summarised. 
Furthermore areas that need further research, investigations and undertakings of analysis are identified. 
7.2 Summary of Key Findings 
1. Map out and summarise how the pharmaceutical sedor In Zimbabwe functions and 
operates and to review the current national pharmaceutlcallaglslatlon and 111111 how the 
TRIPs agreement Is Implemented Into the law system. 
Chapter 5 reviews how the pharmaceutical sector in Zimbabwe functions and operates. It is evident that the 
pharmaceutical industry in Zimbabwe is solely a generic manufacturing industry and therefore relies on 
imminent patent expiry for the production of new generic drugs. The local industry supplies about 60% of 
local consumption and 40% is meet through importation. The total annual consumption is estimated to be 
between US$45-50 million. There are about seven local manufacturers and several private pharmacies and 
wholesalers. There is also a government wholesale, Natpharm, which procures all drugs for all government 
medical inst~utions and some mission hospitals. The procurement of medicines in the country is guided by 
the national drug policy. The policy aims to ensure that only safe, effective and cheap drugs procured and 
are accessed by those who need them. 
All medical premiseS have to be registered with the MCAl. The MCAl is the regulatory authority 
responsible for approval, licenSing and registration of drugs. Medicines can only be approved if they meet 
the safety, quality and effectiveness standards of the board. Furthermore only drugs that are registered can 












Even prior to signing the TRIPs agreement, the country had always been observing all patent laws. 
However, the patents bill is still being revised in order to make it TRIPs compliant. The amendment will 
make sure that all the necessary and suitable provisions are provided for to ensure that aU the life saving 
drugs are available to those who need them. The main provisions to be included are parallel importation, 
compulsory licensing and the 'Solar provision'. However, the government has failed to involve all the key 
players in implementing the bill and some key players are still in the dark with regard to the impact of TRIPs 
on pubHc health. It was felt that the industry could have benefited more if the government had not rushed 
into signing the agreement. There are also certain lobby groups that are against parallel importation on 
grounds that it would be unfair, since the importing companies who will parallel import need not incur 
registration and retention fee costs. On the whole it was felt that if the TRIPs prOVisions are used effectively, 
they could increase access to affordable drugs, there by improving the health status of the majority of the 
population. 
There is no formal or direct price regulation in the country. Nevertheless, the government has certain poHces 
and indirect methods in place to try and curb the escalating drug prices. This mainly includes the drug 
tendering system used in the procurement of medicines for the public sector. Furthermore the essential drug 
poHcy, generic prescribing, drug donation, control of duties and mark ups and employment of certain drug 
financing mechanisms are some of the tools that the government employs to control the prices of medicines. 
Yet, it is evident that it is difficult to employ these tools to control the prices of patented medicines since 
none of the antiretroviral drugs appear on the EDUZ. 
2. Identify and quantify the most Important drugs used to tr. Hlv/AIDS and related 
opportunistic infections that arl registered and marketed in Zimbabwe and review the 
patent status of thue drugs. 
With regard to the above, at least 22 Dosage forms in total were identified for the treatment of opportunistic 
infections. Furthermore, 13 dosage forms of antiretrovirai drugs were identified. These drugs are registered 
with MeAZ and are marketed and distributed in Zimbabwe. These medicines were available both at 
wholesale and retail level during the time the data was collected. The results of the findings are summarised 
in table 3 and 4. 
Table 3 gives a summary of the most commonly used drugs used to treat of HIVIAIDS related illnesses. It is 












fifteen of the drugs are generics, Amphotericin B is branded but it is now off patent and Itraconazole, 
Fluconazole, Klacid and Doxorubicin are still patented. 
Table 4 provides the most commonly used drugs to treat HIVIAIDS in ZimbablNe. It is clear that all the 
antiretroviral drugs that are registered and marketed in ZimbablNe are still patented. Additionally, there are 
no generic antiretroviral drugs marketed in the country because the country observes strong patent laws. 
Therefore, generic importation of antiretroviral drugs was not permitted at the time this research was 
undertaken. Accordingly, this in itself would have a great impact on end user prices in the country. 
3. Conduct an analysis of the main 'acten affldlng drug pricing In ZimbabM In order to 
accurately asslIslnd document how thlle elements (generic competition, drug patenting, 
exchange rates, parallel importation, mark-ups, dutlll, tUII and competitJye tll'ldering) 
haye Influenced thell'ld ullr prices of AIDS and related opportunistic InfldloM drugs In 
Zimbabwe. 
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the results and discussion of the impact of generic competition, drug 
patenting, duties, taxes, mark-ups and competitive tendering. In addition two sensitivity analyses are 
conducted, the first one estimates how black market exchange rates may have influenced the results and 
findings. A sensitivity analysis of the potentiai impact of the presence parallel importation on prices is also 
assessed. 
The impact of patents on drug prices is assessed using price comparisons. The analysis showed that retail 
prices for generics and patented drugs do not vary widely. Nevertheless. the retail prices of generics show a 
much wider variation in the range of retail prices relative to retail prices of the patented brand drugs for both 
antiretroviral and opportunistic infections drugs. Additionally, there are less than five therapeutic alternatives 
for most generic drugs, which could explain the relatively smaller variation in retail prices of generic drugs in 
contrast to variations found in other studies. It follows that patented drugs enjoy monopoly power and there 
is very little price difference among pharmacies. To some extent, there are also monopoly markets for 
generic drugs in ZimbablNe because of felNer therapeutic alternatives for opportunistic infections drugs. 
The results present further evidence that support earlier findings (from other studies) that patented drugs 
tend to be more expensive than generic drugs. Moreover patents (where they are observed) lead to higher 
prices because of the degree monopoly they enjoy. Off patented drugs are less expensive than thosethat 












A comparison between patented antiretroviral drugs in ZimbabYle and their generic equivalent sold in India 
reveals that generics are up to 80 times cheaper in India relative to their patented equivalents in ZimbabYle. 
Drug patenting in 2mbabYle has substantial impact on prices. Monopoly markets are bound to thrive in the 
absence of competition. Lack of generic competition wiD allow multinational companies to keep up high 
prices for as long as possible. As a guiding principle. multinationals seem to set an upper limit (in fixing 
prices) according to what the market can bear. If the international community continues to prioritise patent 
law protection over public health then the people in 21mbabYle will continue to die of the disease in large 
numbers. 
On the other hand drug patenting is not always a bad thing. Patents are necessary since they encourage 
research-based companies to invest in R&D and innovations of neYler drugs. Research based companies 
need to be rewarded for undertaking R&D since R&D requires enormous investment and involves risk. 
Absence of IPR protection. in particular patent protection, can lead to under investment in R&D of newer 
drugs. It would also be unfair to allow generic producers to make profits from generic production of on-
patent drugs at the expense of research-based companies this is because generic manufacturers do not 
really engage in much R&D, which involve enormous risk and requires huge capital investments. The fact 
that generic manufacturers do not cover aU the R&D costs allows them to price their drugs equal to marginal 
cost and stili make a profit. Therefore there is need to sID"ke a balance, generic manufacturers can 
compensate multinational companies through payments of royalties. Indeed multinationals should realise 
that developing countries constitute a smaO percentage of total global sales. Therefore, if generic production 
of patented drugs Ylere to be allowed coupled with royalty payments, then the profits of research based 
companies are less likely to be hurt significantly as long as there is a mechanism in place to prevent 
spillovers of these generics back into industrialised countries. 
It follows that there is need to balance commercial interest of patentees and the development needs of 
poorer countries like 21mbabYle. The results from the price comparison have shown that availability of 
generics result in lower prices for generic antiretroviral drugs. Consequently presence of generic copies in 
ZimbabYle could see the prices of antiretroviral drugs falBng substantiaHy. 
Duties, mark-ups and taxes contribute around 51% to the final price of antiretroviral drugs and about 100% 
to the final price opportunistic infection medicines. The presence of duties, taxes and mark-ups at wholesale 
and retail level could even double the price between manufacturers and consumers. The total contribution of 












Kenya. In ZimbabVle, institutions put different mark-ups and are free to set profit levels they want Such high 
mark-ups and taxes can make it difficult to carry out cross-country comparisons with high precision. 
Additionally, there are certain trade offs associated with policies that aim to reduce prices through reduction 
in taxes and those that aim to curb drug prices by regulating mark-ups at wholesale and retail level Hence, 
the government should evaluate associated impact on utilisation and government revenue losses through 
reduction in taxes and tariffs against under-investment by retailers and wholesalers as a result of reductions 
in mark-ups and dispensing fees. 
The impact of competitive tendering is shown by comparing the prices of selected generics for HIVIAIDS 
related iNnesses in the private sector to those in the public sector. It was shown that the prices in the public 
sector could be up to 1034% cheaper than those in the private sector at wholesale level and up to 172 times 
less expensive in the public sector than In the private sector at retail level. The analysis reveals the 
importance of competitive tendering in the country. Competitive tendering ensures that the government gets 
the best price for their drugs. Hence, in the presence of parallel importation and compulsory licenses, !oVler 
prices for antiretroviral drugs can also be achieved in the public sector through competitive tendering. This 
would put less strain on the already scarce financial resources in the health sector. HOYIever, positive 
results to the benefit of the whole population at large can only materialise if there are policies in place to 
rectify government failure. Public provision in the presence of government failure could result in less optimal 
outcomes. Therefore a Pareto improvement outcome could sometimes be achieved by combining both 
public and private provision. 
Although both sensitivity anatyses that Vlere conducted are not without their faults, there Vlere able to show 
that the results that Vlere obtained earlier are not insensitive to a different exchange rate and the presence 
of parallel importation. A sensitivity anatysis assuming an official exchange rate showed that the prices of 
combination therapies are 5.45 times less compared prices of drugs Imported at the prevailing black market 
rate. It is also evident that at the official rate the prices In Zimbabwe are assumed to be 4.9 times less than 
those in the USA and about only 2.4 times higher than those in India. Consequently consumers in 
Zimbabvwe could be paying up to 445% more for combination therapies under the prevaUing black market 
rate relative to the offICial market rate. 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution, nonetheless they are consistent with economic 
theory, the presence of an unofficial exchange rate implies expensive imports, which can be translated into 












prices can be lowered through generic local production since only raw materials wiD be imported instead of 
importing the whole finished product. This is so because 100% foreign currency 'M)uld not be required to 
purchase locally produced generics. Foreign currency win only be required for raw materials. Moreover 
foreign currency would be made available at offICial market rates to manufacturers who win tenders, in order 
to buy raw materials for drugs that 'M)uld be sold in the public sector. 
In the presence of parallel importation of legal generics of on-patent drugs, the results estimate prices of 
659% less in the public sector and a 39% reduction in prices in the private sector for a yea(s triple therapy 
than the current prices. A cross-country comparison illustrates that prices of about 6.8 times lower in the 
public sector and 28% lower in the private sector than those offered in the USA are possible with parallel 
importation. The price of a triple therapy will only be approximately 1.5 times higher in the public sector and 
about 8.7 times higher in the private sector than in India. The results estimate a possible 10.5 fold reduction 
in price from the current private sector price for the public sector and 3.3 fold reduction in price in private 
sector for triple therapy. More importantly, although the presence of parallel importation wi" not result in total 
afford ability, reduction in prices as a result of parallel importation will at least give incentive to the 
government to include these drugs on the essential list. Consequently, the drugs can be procured through 
tendering. On the other hand, this can only be achieved if govemment is able to provide substantial, 
sustainable and adequate financing for medicines. 
4. To compal'l prices of HIVIAIDS drugs In Zimbabwe with international prices and briefly 
asstll and discuss the Implications of the final consumer prices on access to affordable 
drugs used to treat HIVIAIDS. 
Chapter 6 also compares the prices of antiretroviral drugs in Zimbabwe with international prices for which 
comparable data is available and briefly looks at the implication of the final end users prices in Zimbabwe on 
access to affordable drugs. Of the drugs surveyed the retail prices of all antiretroviral drugs281 were higher in 
Zimbabwe than in USA, Brazil, India and Uganda. This is besides the fact that Brazil and USA are much 
more developed and more affluent than Zimbabwe. The expected pattern of lower prices for lower-income 
countries is not evident here. This supports the idea that multinational companies target sales at local elites 
in developing countries and set their prices according to what the market can bear. As a result, these drugs 
are out of the reach of the majority of the population conSidering that they meet their drug costs through out-
of-pocket payments. In contrast, for most individuals in the USA, costs of health services and medication are 
meet by prepaid private insurance or public health insurance. 












About 1,404 000 million HIVIAIDS patience need treatment every year and it would cost the Zimbabwean 
government about US $15 billion to provide the cheapest triple therapy treatment for these people. This 
amount is in excess of the current annual health budget. Essentially it costs the Brazilian public health 
system the same amount to treat 1,000 HIVIAIDS patients per year, as it would cost the Zimbabwean 
government to treat approximately 182 HIVIAIDS patients per year if the government tried to provide 
antiretroviral drugs. It would cost an average farm worker an equivalent of 15,8 years' salary and an 
equivalent of 4.8 years' salary for an average manufacturing worker if they were to purchase a year's triple 
therapy. This is in stark contrast with developed countries where a year's treatment for HIV infections costs 
an equivalent of four to six month's salary and a greater part of the costs of drugs is reimbursed. 
Additionally, as a result of the availability of cheaper generics, the Brazilian and Indian government were 
able to provide antiretroviral drugs to more than 00.000 citizens by the end of 1999 and this led to a more 
than 50% drop in AIDS-related mortality between 1996 and 1999. 
In summary, this study has shown that patents, competitive tendering, availability of generics, taxes, duties, 
mark-ups, exchange rates and parallel importation have substantially impact on the prices of AIDS and 
related opportunistic infections drugs in Zimbabwe. Competitive tendering and availability of generics 
through parallel importation or iocal production could result in the reduction of drug prices by a substantial 
amount. This could pave W?IJ for the availability of affordable HIV/AIDS and related ilnesses. On the other 
hand absence of generic competition (as a resulted of patents). high taxes, duties and mark-ups and 
unofficial market exchange rates have contributed substantially to high drug prices in the country. Thus, 
these drugs are out of the reach of the majority of the population and the government of Zimbabwe. Price 
should not be an obstacle to preventing affordable access to medicines. Excessive prices make it unfeasible 
for the government to finance such drugs since it would consume a considerable amount of the health 
budget. Exorbitant on-patent drug prices have aiso led to their exclusion from the essential list. Unaffordable 
medicines mean that public health cannot be protected, and the implications of failure to protect public 
health are devastating. On the other hand, the government should also act accordingly to try and come up 












1.3 Policy Recommendations in The Context of Key Findings 
There are effective medicines that exist to treat AIDSIHIV and related illnesses that are responsible for the 
high mortality and morbidity rates in Zimbab\'\le. Ho\'\lever, these medicines are out of the reach of the 
government and the majority of the population. This is IS a result of many interrelated factors, of which,high 
drug prices play a critical role as evidenced in this study. Efforts to alleviate the disease will be fruitless if 
there are no policies in place to counter act escalating drug prices. This thesis will offer some policy 
recommendations that arise from the study in order to help policy makers make informed decisions. 
Patents are one way to encourage innovation for ne\'\ler drugs and hence offer benefits to society. On the 
other hand they contribute substantially to high drug prices that are currently causing significant delays in 
provision of cheaper medication to treat AIDSIHIV and related illnesses. Thus a balance should be struck 
bet\'\leen commerciai interest of the patent holders and the public good. Since the govemment is already 
signatory to the TRiPs agreement ~ should try at all cost to make its legislation TRIPs compliant This would 
allow the govemment to declare a state of emergency so as to make use of compulsory licensing and 
parallel importation. As noted earlier, these two provisions 1NOU1d allow the flow of cheaper generics Into the 
country instead of expensive on-patent drugs. 
On the other hand for the benefits of the above provisions to be realised there are certain standards that the 
govemment should meet, otherwise evoking the provision 'NOuld result in a mere waste of resources. There 
is need to prepare the health system for the implementation of such provisions. 
Firstly, there is need to put an AIDS drug policy in place that 'NOuld serve as a guiding principle. This policy 
Is necessary in order to equip the health system with the necessary tools required for the successful 
implementation of the provisions. Among other things the AIDS policy should state clearly the specific 
combination therapies and other drugs that the govemment 'NOuld import or issue compulsory licences for. It 
should also clearly state the manufacturers who are to produce these drugs locally if compulsory licences 
are to be Issued. The choice of manufacturers should be based on the capability and expertise to produce 
and adequately meet local demand. The policy should also document the countries where the government 
1NOU1d parallel import from and decide on how much to import and on how much to produced locally. The 
government also needs to document the prescribers, Le. whether the drugs 'NOuld be prescribed at all public 
hospitals or at specific hospitals. The staff at different hospitals also needs to be trained in order to 
familiarise themselves with the dosage forms and related prescribing methods. The financing mechanism 













reallocate the state budget in order to allocate more resources to the health sector. The policy should also 
include any potential donors. The policy should document the means and ways of distributing the drugs to 
the rural communities and other hospitals in remote areas. 
Secondly, thereis need to deal with current economic Issues that may hinder the smooth running of such 
polices. For example the absence of foreign currency could act as an obstacle to importing cheaper drugs or 
produce them locally to meet local demand. The government should strive to coordinate its policies and 
come up with a holistic approach to solving the current economic crisis. This indicates the impact of the 
macro economic situation on the health sector. 
It is wrong however to assume that such provisions alone will solve the problem of affordability. Medicines 
may still be unaffordable, but if the implementation of the provisions Is well coordinated. it 'M)uld act as a 
key element in encouraging domestic financing and competitive tendering. This would further facilitate and 
improve access to affordable drugs. and hence, provide a sustainable way to obtain cheaper drugs. 
The government should also consider reviewing the budget so that more financial resources are allocated to 
health and diverted from other sectors such as defence. The present government should abstain from 
prioritising the needs of a few elites at the expense of the majority of the populations. The government 
should come up with new means and ways of mobilising financial resources so as to Improve the financing 
system of the health sector. Such efforts should also be accompanied by support from international and 
local NGOs. In short, there is need for political commitment by the state, it should prioritise the needs of the 
people rather than continue to pursue polices that are self-serving at the expense of the majority of the 
population. 
The country should also follow other countries like Uganda that have embarked on an accelerative access 
initiative policy. Yet, this initiative can only'M>rk in the presence of an AIDS drug policy. Furthermore the 
state should try and initiate regional bulk purchasing. For instance, negotiating with other members of the 
SADC countries so that they can to come together and parallel import from generic manufacturers in bulk. 
This bulk purchasing 'M)uld result in substantial discounts from manufacturers since bulk purchasing or 
regional procurement creates high volume and high demand. This 'M)uld help further curb the prices of 
antiretroviral and AIDS drugs not only in Zimbabwe but in other affected SADC countries This 'M)uld 
increase rather than restrict the number of patients to be treated in the region as a whole. On the other hand 













It was shown earlier that taxes and mark-ups do contribute substantially to the end user prices. However it 
was also noted that there are trade offs associated with targeting both mark-ups and taxes. These trade offs 
call for the government to come up with polices that encourage or act as incentives for pharmacies and 
wholesalers to reduce their mark-ups, for instance offering pharmacies and wholesales subsidies that are 
financed through taxes, so as to curb escalating drug prices. Also, the pharmacies and wholesalers should 
try and reach an agreement and set fixed mark-ups for expensive drugs like antiretroviral drugs that are vital 
for the survival of HIV patients. 
The government should continue to make use of the tendering system even in the presence of parallel 
importation or compulsory licensing for the procurement of antiretroviral drugs. The tendering system 'M)uId 
ensure that the government gets even lower prices on top of the reduction in prices resulting from the 
implementation of the provisions. However. there is need to make sure that the tendering system is not 
fraught with government faHure for example corruption and red tape that may hinder the smooth running of 
the system. This could be done by constantly monitoring the system to ensure that government failure is 
minimised. It is important to ensure that essential antiretroviral drugs are included on the essential list so 
that they can be procured through the tendering system. 
The issue of direct price controls should also be looked at. however price controls require enormous 
information and evaluation of the side effects of such controls. These should be weighed against the 
benefits of price controls. Furthermore lack of expertise to actually initiate price controls should be 
addressed by offering the necessary training to authorities responsible and by seeking advise from other 
countries that implement such controls. 
Moreover, since there is no cure for aids and the prices of drugs are souring, traditional medicines are 
increasingly becoming important In the treatment of HIV related diseases in Zimbabwe. There are many 
approved traditional preparations on the market in Zimbabwe. so the prices of these preparations should 
have a profound effect on the treatment of AIDS and opportunistic infections. Hence, the govemment should 
try and 'M)rk hand in hand with Zimbabwe Traditional Healers Association (Z1NA THA) by allowing them to 
test their medicines in labs and help them prescribe their medicines in correct dosage forms. The 
international community should also come into play by providing funding so as to encourage R&D into 
traditional medicines. 
Developed countries should \I\IOrk hand in hand with the country. They should refrain from threatening 












known to use threats at developing countries that have tried to make use of these provisions.282 There is 
also need to review the restrictions that come with the provisions; for instance, compulsory licensing should 
only be predominantly for local production. This implies that generic manufacturers in countries tike Brazil 
and India can only export smaller amounts to Zimbabwe. Moreover these countries are in constant fear of 
trade sanctions from developed countries. Therefore the TRIPs should be amended so as to allow exports 
to certain developing countries in real need (like Zimbabwe) that have high AIDS rates. Slow response to 
the crisis at hand would continue if impediments associated with the provisions are not dealt with. 
Technological transfer is also necessary if the country is to issue compulsory licenses. Newer drugs cannot 
be produced effICiently using outdated technology. Therefore, the state should initiate technological transfer 
by sending delegates to countries tike India for training and also invest in new machinery needed to produce 
the drugs. This v.oold encourage and facifitate the production of quality generics. 
Price discrimination is a potential policy that multinational companies could consider introducing that may 
result in lower prices compared to the profit maximising price strategies that most multinational companies 
use. Multinationals could sell their drugs at a lower price in poorer countries with high price elasticises 
relative to high-income countries. Price discrimination has potential in the presence of mechanisms that 
prevent flow backs of drugs into high-income countries. However price discrimination has to be systematic 
and should only be allowed so as to benefit poorer countries. 
Finally there is need for an international database that shows different prices in different countries. This is 
because drug price information is very scant universally, thus it should be coliect and made accessible to 
developing countries. This would reinforce the effectiveness of parallel importation since the database would 
enable the government of Zimbabwe to make informed decisions as to where they should parallel import. It 
could also help them decided as to whether it is cheaper for them to manufacture locally or to parallel Import 
from other countries. 
To sum up, the above policies should not be implemented in isolation because no one policy would solve 
the problem of high drug prices if implemented in isolation. There is need for a holistic approach that is 
comprehensive where mutually supportive strategies are implemented concurrently. 












7.4 Suggested Recommendations for Future Research 
It is evident that the results and key findings \¥ere affected by the timing of the research. The research was 
conducted at a time when the country was experiencing an economic recession and going through an 
economic crisis. The same study should be undertaken in future when the economic crisis has passed. It 
would be interesting to compare the results and evaluate how much the crisis influenced the above results 
and findings. Furthermore, it is too early to assess the impact of the TRiPs agreement in particular the effect 
of employing the provisions on drug prices. Therefore, future studies should try and assess Ylhether the 
potential positive Impacts on prices as a result of making use of the provisions would actuaRy materialise. 
There also is need to develop economic models for predicting or determining the effects of international 
agreements like TRiPs on pharmaceutical prices. Economic models should also be developed to test for 
robustness of results. The results from this study combined with results from economic models to be 
developed in future could be used to develop and test hypothesises in more advanced studies. There is 
need to carry out price surveys in Zimbab\¥e so that researchers can have access to reliable data on 
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9.1 Appendix 1: Drug Price Survey 
Table a: Opportunistic infections Drugs 
Mark-up 25% 25% 
Acyclovir (3O"200mg) 
Cotnmoxazole (1OOO*48OmQ) $80.75 8.91 
$177.40 
Ketaconazole (100"200mg) $124.24 $113.09 
~ldazole (1ooo"2O()mg) $94.85 
Mk:onazole (V8I!I. Cteam 4()g) 
Mk:onazole $32.62 
Miconazole (cream 20!1) $8.75 
.. ,'" • (1ooo"25Omg) 
NYstatin (15) $21.53 
~tatin (00II suspension 3OmI1 
$376.82 
Sporanox (15*100mg) 
Wtamin B-comDlex (100"5Omg) 
Predillisolone (1000' Smg) $145.80 
$134.18 $104.07 
17ilhromax (3"5OOmg) $278.62 
Izilhromax (6*25Oma) $49.24 
~itIlJUne (1000*2Smg) 
~acid (10*25Omg) $151.53 $155.18 
Doxorubicin flV ·3*15Oma1 












ratio of IowMl 
10% 10% ~ ~5% 10% 
$27.73 $39.45 $27.73 $39.45 1.4' $ 33.59 
2.7S $ 64.76 
2.U S 112.15 
$115.13 $111.73 $111.73 $124.64 $123.25 $111.73 $124.64 1.1~ $ 115.13 
$102.73 $60.38 $99.18 $80.85 $99.09 $60.38 $102.73 1.7( $ 96.97 
$20.25 $23.20 $23.64 $21.82 $20.25 $23.64 1.1 $ 22.51 
1$28.38 1 11 e ')01\11 
$3.38 $3.96 $8.22 $7.114 $7.27 $3.38 $8.75 2.5S $ 6.75 
$327.27 $262.84 $259.09 $276.36 $381.82 $259.09 $388.15 1.5C $ 301.82 
$20.38 $20.38 $19.71 $19.71 $21.53 l.OS $ 20.38 
$27.93 $39.15 $41.22 $28.64 $48.18 $27.93 $48.18 1.7~ $ 39.15 
$375.00 $313.64 1$313.64 1$313.64 1$376.82 1.2t $ 363.40 
$331.36 $304.33 $313.64 $304.33 $331.36 1.00 $ 313.64 
$10.95 $14.09 $11.27 $10.95 $14.09 1.2!I $ 11.85 
$120.29 $118.47 $84.09 $132.87 $120.00 $84.09 $145.80 1.7~ $ 120.00 
1$23.64 1$134.18 5.6Il $ 79.31 
$122.73 $121.82 $116.35 $278.62 2.3~ $ 122.27 
$27.13 $27.13 $49.24 1.8' $ 38.18 
$107.82 $107.65 $128.53 $104.18 $104.18 $167.25 1.61 $ 107.82 














Table b: Antiretroviral Drugs 
r.atlo of 
Drug ~1x.A Medlx P Greenwood ~1Iondllle Plm I:Iorrowdale Pastol ~V ~lghHt 
~mto 
median shamrock Iowm ~lghHt 
3tc(oraI sin. 24Om1l $260.91 S260.91 $260.91 U 260.11 
Epivir, 3te (60*15Omg) $918.18 $932.91 $1,272.15 $918.18 $1,272.15 1.~ 932.11 
RelroW (1oo'100mal $435.73 $694.78 $415.84 $415.84 $694.78 1. 435.7 
fielroW (syrup 2OOmI) $435.73 $260.91 $260.91 $435.73 1. 348.3 
rombivir (60*450) $752.73 $945.45 $972.40 $1,365.45 $1,655.11 $752.73 $1,655.11 2.~ 972.4 
~ivid (100) $999.58 $999.58 $999.58 1.( 999.E 
nvarlse (270"2OOmQ) $1,490.76 $1,757.13 $721 
Ml'IICept (270*25Omg) $2.483.64 $545.45 $2599.80 $3,545.16 $1640.00 3. 
~dex (60·100mg) $210.25 $210.25 $210.25 $168.18 $163.64 $149.84 $214.15 $256.93 $184.98 $149.84 $256.93 1. 210.3 
tzerit (60 $89.40 $83.15 $83.15 $83.82 $71.96 $95.02 $89.16 $63.82 $95.02 U 83.1 
~ (180*4OOma1 $494.95 $570.62 $570.62 $472.91 $443.53 $424.51 $443.98 $827.15 $424.51 $827.15 U 483.S 
~ramune (60"2OOmg) $317.27 $410.18 $335.45 $517.18 $372.64 $335.45 $517.18 1.! 377.~ 
















507.58 $ 131.73 
394.62 $ 21.79 
SouICe for prices in India: http://www.cipladoc.com/publicationsiaidswatchlaidsupdate.htmtmewprices 
Table d: Cross Country comparisons 












Table e: Private VS Public: sedor Prices 
~holuale level 
private sedor .,ubllc: sector ratio 
ovir $ 28.18 S 3.85 631% 
xazoIe $ 92.39 $ 8.15 1034% 
thacin $ 66.91 $ 0.67 9846% 
idazole $ 57.62 $ 0.71 8026% 
-vargo Cream $ 14.98 $ 1.02 1371% 
oral gel $ 17.82 $ 3.80 36~% 
Predinisoione $ 66.64 $ 14.64 369% 
Retail level 
~ruJl private sector public: sector ratio 
ndomethacln $105.37 S 77.16 37% 
Metronidazole $ 89.48 $ 84.25 6% 
Miconazole-varg. Cream $ 22.26 $ 0.13 17143% 
Mlconazole cream $ 6.23 $ 0.18 3325_% 
Predinisoione $118.64 $134.36 13% 












9.5 Appendix 2: Structured questions for the key informants at the ministry of health 
• Can u give any details of government negotiated voluntary licences with local and 
international companies? 
• If yes 
Company Drug 
• Could descnbe the current measures or policies that are currently in place to 
promote generic competition? 
• What is the country's position with regard to the accelerative initiative 
programme? 
• What schemes exist for bilateral negotiations and bulk purchasing, in order to 
negotiate for low prices both at international, regional and local level? 
• List the name of the countries and the manufactures 
• Which pharmaceutical manufacturers are supplying these drugs to Zimbabwe at a 
discount or donating them? 
Manufacturer Drug 
Capturing market structure and degree of competition 
Branded name Therapeutic Locally Imported 
alternatives produced (company) 
(company) 
• What structures are currently in place within the legislation with regard to paranel 
importation? 
• Comments: If there are no drugs that are being imported estimate the amount that 












• Can you outline and elaborate any negotiations for meaningful price reductions 
that are already in place? 
120 
• Is there policy in place to ensure that the poor get these drugs at a cheaper price 
than the rich, and how does this policy work? 
• Which of the drugs on the indicator are available both in the public sector and in 
the private sector? Record the price difference of these drugs both at wholesale 
and retail level? 
Drug Price in the public Price in the private 
sector sector 
• What is the current situation with regard to private insurance or social health 
insurance coverage of antiretroviral and opportunistic infections drugs? 
• What is the main source of drug financing? 
Social health insurance ____ _ 
Government funded ____ _ 
Out-of-pocket ______ _ 
Private health insurance ----
Comments: 
1 •• 1 Access to drugs 
Data to be collected Sources Comments 
DHS (household DHS 
income, age, sex,) 
Aids cases and aids NAC 
mortality 
Treatment rates Ministry of health 
• No of aids cases to be treated 
• How many cases have been treated/not treated 












• The health sector 
• Per capita heath spending 
• Annual health budget as a percentage of the total health budget 
• What are the national health priorities, and what polices are currently in place 
to help achieve them. 
• What percentage of the health budget goes to the financing of drugs in 
general? 
• What policy is in place with regard to the provision of antiretroviral drugs 
• What percentage of the population has access to health insurance? 
• Could you comment on external assistance by donors and donor-funded 
projects, and are these donations sustainable and what conditions do they 
come with. 
• NB: All the questions above were supplemented by follow up questions to 











9.5 Appendix 3: Structured Questions Informants at MeAl for Key 
\It Has Zimbabwe already started implementing the TRIPS agreement? 
\It Yes No ----------- -----------
\It If yes when was it first implemented? ______ _ 
\It If no when will it be implemented? _______ _ 
\It What provisions of the TRIPS agreement that are incorporated into the national 
legislation? 
122 
\It What national priorities and policies does the proposed implementation take into 
account? 
\It What are the policy instruments that are outside the intellectual property rights 
that are used to address issues of access and prices of drugs, e.g. price or 
reimbursement controls. 
\It What are the TRIPS safeguards that are provided for under the agreement that the 
government has/will adopted/adopt and How are these safeguards being utilised 
or how will they be utilised? 
• If no Compulsory licences have been issued, what are the main reasons for not 
issuing such licences? 
\It What are the grounds for issuing compulsory licences that are allowed by 
Zimbabwe's national legislation. (Tick the appropriate ones and add any 
additional below) 
o Public health reasons 
o Emergency situations 
o To remedy anti-competitive practices 
o To protect the environment 
o Public non-commercial use 
\It Can u describe in detail the current policy situation with regard to paranel 
importation of medicines? (Use follow up questions for elaborations) 
\It Patent Laws 












• Does the Patent law provide for process patent or product patent or both? 
Describe in detail the scope of patentability 
• Describe and outline in detail the current measures that the pharmaceutical 
regulatory authorities have put in place to monitor supply and prices of drugs? 
• Does the patent law make provisions for parallel importation, Bolar-type 
provision and compulsory licence? 
Patent status of drugs from the indicator list 
Company Drug Patent status I Patent expilY 
Comments 
Document review 
Data to be collected Sources of data Comments 
Pharmaceutical price Document review, NB: 
regulation laws Medicines control price controls with 
(guidelines) authority of Zimbabwe. regard to antiretroviral 
and opportunistic 
infection drugs 
Implementation of the Same as above Document review of 
TRIPS agreement into established data 
the law system 
(guidelines) 
Drug patenting Same as above Review the guidelines 
guidelines (laws and to drug patenting 
legislations) 
-Indicator list of -National register for Need to identify the 
antiretroviral drugs and drugs-Drug control most important drugs 
opportunistic infection authority of Zimbabwe and draw up an 
drugs that are registered -Natpharm indicator list. 
and marketed in -Review the essential 
Zimbabwe drug list and identify the 
-Obtain a list of these antiretroviral and 
drugs that appear on the opportunistic infection 


























9.5 Appendix 4: Structured questions for the key infonnants at Manufacturing Companies 
• Could you give a brief introduction with regard to your company and the type of 
industry your operating in? 
• What is the pharmaceutical consumption per capita? 
• Could you provide information with regard to your sales volumes and production 
volume? 
• What is your total market share for the domestic industry? 
• What percentage of your total annual sales is from exports? 
• Which countries are you currently exporting to? 
• Briefly explain your interpretation of the TRIPs agreement 
• How do you see the agreement affecting your day to day running of the business? 
• What do you thing are the potential impacts of the agreement on foreign direct 
investment, transfer of technology, research and development for the local 
industry 
• How are you going to make use of the TRIPs safeguards? 













9.5 Appendix 5: Some background information on antiretroviral drugs 
Source: httpf/www.cipladoc.comlpublicationslaidswatchlaidsupdate.htm#neworices 
Classification of antlretroviral drugs 
Nucleotide revenll transcrlptale Non-nucleotide revenll Protellllnhlbltors (Pie) 
Inhibitors (NRTIe) transcrlptale inhibitors 
(NNRTls) 
Zklovudine Nevirapine Indinavir 
Stavudine Efavirenz Nellinavir 




Triple drug Intlretrovlral combinations 
• lamivudine + Stavudine + Nevirapine (TRIOMUNE-30/40) 
• ZkIovl.ldine + Lamivudine + Nevirapine (DUOVIR-N) 
• lamivudine + Stavudine (LAMIVIR-S 30/40) + Efavirenz (EFAVIR) 
• Zklovudine + lamivudine (DUOVIR) + Efavirenz (EFAVIR) 
• Lamivudine + Stavudine (LAMIVIR-S 30/40) + Indinavir (INDIVAN) 
• ZkIovudine + Lamivudine (DUOVIR) + Indinavir (INDIVAN) 
• Didanosine (DINEX) + Stavudine (STAVIR-40) + Nevirapine (NEVIMUNE) 
• Didanosine (DINEX) + Stavudine (STAVIR-40) + Efavirenz (EFAVIR) 
• Didanosine (DINEX) + Stavudine (STAVIR-40) + Indinavir (IN DIVAN) 
How long should the HIV-Infected patient continue taking Intiretrovirlls? 
It is important to appreciate that antiretroviral therapy should be continued indefinitely. This is because 
therapy is suppressive and not curative. The patient should be started on antiretrovirais only if he is 
committed to lifelong therapy. 
Why can't HIV infection be eradicated? 
HIV infects various cells and body compartments including the CNS, testes, etc. The virus remains latent in 
certain cells such as the long-lived resting memory CD4 cells. Antiretroviral therapy is not effective against 













Combination Therapy in mv -infected Patients 
With the explosion in the number of HIV-infected individuals and those w~h full blown AIDS. the 
management of HIV infections is of critical importance to every physician. New approaches to mon~oring 
and treating patients have improved management. These include a better understanding of the replication 
kinetics of HIV throughout the disease process, the development of quantitative viral assays that help to 
predict the progression of the disease and the availability of new antiretroviral agents. Most importantly I 
there is now sufficient cUnicai data to prove that combination therapy w~ 3 drugs is far superior to mono or 
dual therapy and can suppress viral replication up to 2 years 
Rationale of Combination Therapy 
Currently, 11 antiretroviral agents are approved by various health authorities worldwide. None of these 
agents can eradicate the Infection but given in combination they can suppress viral replication, Improve 
immunologic status, delay infectious complications and prolong life. The high viral tumover rate and the 
error prone nature of the RNA virus replication make ~ mandatory for potent combinations to be used, and 
an approach that does not maximally suppress viral replication can lead to resistance and treatment failure 
Recent studies have shown that there are reservoirs of H IV such as the resting memory CD4 cells, cells in 
the brain etc., which harbour the virus for prolonged periodS and make viral eradication diffICUlt. Different 
drugs can target different cellular reservoirs and cells in different stages of activation. For example, 
zidovudine is more effective in replicating peripheral blood mononuclear cells, while lamivuudine, usually 
used in combination, is more effective in resting cells. 
Rusons for Combination Therapy 
1. Potent inhibition of viral replication 
2. Prevention of emergence of resistant strains. 
3. Sustained clinical improvement 
4. Target different cellular reservoirs 0 H IV 
5. Target cells in different stages of activation 












There is no single combination that is best for all patients. A regimen is usually chosen which is expected to 
durably reduce the plasma HIV RNA below the lowest limit of detection (as measured by sensitive assays) 
thereby preventing the development of resistance and providing sustained clinical benefit. Several clinical 
trials have examined various combinations. In addition to the above, the choice also depends on the 
following factors: 
1. Tolerability profiles 
2. Past clinical history e.g. history of peripheral neuropathy or pancreatitis. 
3. Potential of a given agent or regimen to limit future therapeutic options or activity due to selection 
of cross-resistant or multkJrug resistant mutants. 
4. Pharmacokinetic and metabolic interactions e.g. liver enzyme system, Inductor or inhibitor, 
intracellular interactions etc. 
5. Activity in different cell lines. 
6. Convenience of administration. 
7. Administration of antiretroviral therapy in the past. 
Most combinations recommended include a combination of two nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors 
(NRTls) with a protease inhibitor (PI) or non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI). Others 
include 2Pls plus 1 or 2NRTls, 1 PI and 1 NNRTI with or without 2 NRTls and 3 NRTls. 
These regimens result in virologic success rates from 60% to 90% as judged by reduction of plasma H IV 
RNA to less than 500 copieslml at 24 weeks or beyond. It is difficult to say if one combination is superior to 
another. The combination of zidovudine, lamivudine and indinavir (Figs. 1 & 2) is synergistic and has been 
shown to significantly reduce plasma viral load for up to 1 year and is superior to dual therapy. If zidovudine 
is not suitable then stavudine with lamivudine (or didanosine) and a PI or NNRTI is a good option. 
Saquinavir or nelfinavir may be useful for initial regimens since neither causes cross-resistance that would 
preclude subsequent use of other Pis. 
